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ABSTRACT 
One of the most significant legislative reforms of the U.S. patent 
system occurred in 1952. Prior to 1952, the patent system found itself 
languishing, undermined by a confusing nonstatutory patentability 
requirement called the “invention” requirement. In 1952, Congress 
and the President eliminated it. Today we find ourselves in a situation 
surprisingly similar to the one prior to 1952. The patent system again 
finds itself languishing, undermined by a new confusing nonstatutory 
patentability requirement, this one called the “inventive concept” 
requirement. Today, just like in 1952, there are ongoing calls for 
Congress and the President to eliminate it. Given the striking parallels 
between these two eras—and the success of legislative reform efforts 
in 1952—I have studied the forces behind the reform of 1952: the 
problems with the law of the day, the people and groups of people 
involved in reform efforts, and the circumstances and strategies they 
used to their advantage to create change. This study has led me to 
identify various factors that led to the success of those efforts in 1952. 
In parallel with the study of the history behind the Patent Act of 1952, 
I highlight the problems with the law today, the people and groups of 
people involved today in reform efforts, and the circumstances and 
strategies they might use to their advantage to create change. 
Moreover, drawing from the factors that led to the success of 
legislative reform efforts in 1952, I analyze how those same factors 
may contribute to the success of current legislative reform efforts—or 
hinder it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most significant legislative reforms of the U.S. patent 
system occurred in 1952. Prior to 1952, the patent system found itself 
languishing, undermined by a confusing nonstatutory “invention” 
requirement.1 In 1952, Congress and the President eliminated it, 
replacing it with what ultimately became known as the 
“nonobviousness” requirement.2 In 1966, the Supreme Court accepted 
what Congress and the President had done and applied the 
nonobviousness requirement rather than the invention requirement in 
a series of cases, providing the inventive community with a clear test 
for patentability.3 
Today we find ourselves in a situation surprisingly similar to the 
one prior to 1952. The patent system again finds itself languishing, 
undermined by a new confusing nonstatutory “inventive concept” 
 
 1. See, e.g., NAT’L PATENT PLANNING COMM’N, THE AMERICAN PATENT 
SYSTEM, H.R. DOC. NO. 78-239, at 5 (1943) (“The most serious weakness in the 
present patent system is the lack of a uniform test or standard for determining whether 
the particular contribution of an inventor merits the award of the patent grant . . . . 
Novelty alone is not sufficient, nor is utility, nor is the final accomplishment. There 
must also be present some mysterious ingredient connoted in the term ‘invented’ . . . . 
The difficulty is that there is no accepted uniform standard among [the] several 
tribunals which can be applied in the same or similar cases . . . . No other feature of 
our law is more destructive to the purpose of the patent system than this existing 
uncertainty as to the validity of a patent . . . . The present confusion threatens the 
usefulness of the whole patent system and calls for an immediate and effective 
remedy.”). 
 2. See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (codified 
as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012)) (“A patent may not be obtained though the 
invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this 
title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior 
art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time 
the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said 
subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which 
the invention was made.”). 
 3. See generally Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 3 (1966) 
(describing nonobviousness as a requirement of patentability); United States v. 
Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 48 (1966) (providing that nonobviousness is one of three tests 
of patentability that must be satisfied in a valid patent).  
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requirement.4 Today, just like in 1952, there are ongoing calls for 
Congress and the President to eliminate it.5 Even if they do so, 
however, it is not certain whether the Supreme Court will accept the 
elimination of the inventive concept requirement and apply a new 
statutory requirement in its place, let alone whether a new statutory 
requirement will provide the inventive community with a clear test for 
patentability. 
Given the striking parallels between these two eras—and the 
success of legislative reform efforts in 1952—I have sought to 
understand exactly how the reform occurred in 1952, and therefore 
how similar reform might occur today. This effort required studying 
the forces behind the reform of 1952: the problems with the law of the 
day, the people and groups of people involved in reform efforts, and 
the circumstances and strategies they used to their advantage to create 
change. This study has led me to identify various factors that led to the 
success of those efforts in 1952, success in terms of the enactment of 
the legislation but also how that legislation ultimately supplanted the 
Supreme Court’s invention requirement with the nonobviousness 
requirement. Thus, what follows, first, is a description of this history, 
including these problems, people, groups, circumstances, strategies, 
and factors.6 
After exploring this history and the lessons it teaches, I consider 
the present state of the patent system and, in particular, the Supreme 
Court’s recent creation of the inventive concept requirement.7 
Tracking the study of the history behind the Patent Act of 1952, I 
similarly highlight the problems with the law today, the people and 
groups of people involved today in reform efforts, and the 
circumstances and strategies they might also use to their advantage to 
create change.8 Moreover, drawing from the factors that led to the 
 
 4. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Peter S. Menell & David O. Taylor, Final 
Report of the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology Section 101 Workshop: 
Addressing Patent Eligibility Challenges, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 551, 561 (2018) 
(“The uncertainty and confusion resulting from the Court’s recent jurisprudence 
[adopting the ‘inventive concept’ requirement] create significant problems for many 
companies and investors contemplating research and development projects, . . . patent 
prosecutors, patent examiners, and patent jurists.”). 
 5. At least three organizations have proposed legislation that would 
eliminate the inventive concept requirement in favor of a different patentability test. 
See JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44943, PATENTABLE SUBJECT 
MATTER REFORM 15–16 (2017) (summarizing these proposals). 
 6. See infra Part I. 
 7. See infra Section II.A. 
 8. See infra Section II.A.  
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success of legislative reform efforts in 1952, I analyze how those same 
factors may contribute to the success of current legislative reform 
efforts—or hinder it.9  
My analysis leads to three important suggestions to modern day 
reformists. First, there is a clear need for legislative intervention, 
which will become a long-felt need the longer intervention is delayed, 
and so some measure of patience is in order. Second, the patent bar 
needs to consolidate forces, present one proposal, and speak with a 
unified voice. Third, to agree upon one proposal, reformists need to 
demonstrate flexibility and, if possible, adopt a prior judicial test that 
provides an objective standard. 
Given how closely the problem with the patent system today 
mirrors the system’s problem in 1952, I have organized this Article 
into just two Parts. Part I explores the history of the Patent Act of 1952 
and the enactment of the nonobviousness requirement to replace the 
invention requirement.10 Drawing from this historical analysis, Part II 
then analyzes the present problems associated with the inventive 
concept requirement and similar strategies that may be used to replace 
it with a more appropriate requirement.11 
I. PATENT REFORM—THEN 
The Patent Act of 1952 represented a significant 
accomplishment: the elimination of the Supreme Court’s notorious 
invention requirement. This Part considers the forces behind the 
legislative reform of 1952—the problems with the invention 
requirement, the people and groups of people who sought to eliminate 
it, and the circumstances and strategies they used to accomplish this 
goal. Based on a detailed historical analysis, it identifies the factors 
that led to the success of legislative reform efforts in 1952, resulting 
in the elimination of the invention requirement. 
A. Clear Need for Legislative Intervention 
The first factor that contributed to the success of the legislative 
reform of 1952 was a clear need for legislative intervention. This clear 
need reflected several underlying circumstances: a long-felt need for 
improvement, problems emanating from the Supreme Court, lower 
 
 9. See infra Section II.C.  
 10. See infra Part I. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
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court and Patent Office confusion, identification of the precise 
problem by a national committee, and, finally, a sense of urgency. 
1. Long-Felt Need for Improvement 
Experts in the patent field had long known the patent system was 
not perfect in various respects. In 1936, for example, the Journal of 
the Patent Office Society marked the occasion of the 100th anniversary 
of the Patent Act of 1836—the genesis of the modern patent system—
by recognizing that a large number of then-recent proposals for change 
suggested that there was room for improvement of the patent system.12  
Leading up to around 1950, moreover, the calls for reform 
increased. Indeed, “[f]or some time there had been a movement to 
amend the patent laws, to modernize them, and to remove the 
obsolescent debris that had formed about them.”13 Looking back on 
this movement, L. James Harris in 1955 remarked that the “agitation 
had been quite formidable.”14 He explained that “[t]he courts of the 
United States during the past several decades ha[d] shown an 
increasing tendency to invalidate patents.”15 “The revisers,” he 
continued, “no longer content with carrying on the controversy that 
had continued down through the years, sought to improve the law.”16 
 
 12. See P.J. Federico, One Hundred Years Old, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 1, 4–5 
(1936) (“The charge is frequently made that law, in general, is unable to keep pace 
with civilization and is always lagging behind progress in other fields of human 
endeavor. This same accusation has been made against patent law. And yet, because 
of its immediate contact with most things new, patent law is probably the most 
advanced branch of the law. Since it affects all the vital developments in invention 
and industry, it ought to become even more progressive. While closer study may show 
that some of the suggestions for change which have been offered in the past are ill-
advised or unnecessary, yet others indicate real possibilities of pronounced value and 
should be further investigated. Nevertheless, whether these proposals for change are 
ill-advised or valuable, they do suggest, in the large number that are presented, that 
the present patent structure is open to criticism and that consequently there is 
unquestionably room for further improvement in the system.”). 
 13. L. James Harris, Some Aspects of the Underlying Legislative Intent of the 
Patent Act of 1952, 23 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 658, 658 (1955). 
 14. Id.; see also P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 75 J. PAT. 
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 161, 166 (1993) (“For some time there was agitation for a 
modern complete restatement and codification of all laws of the United States, 
inasmuch as the only prior codification, the Revised Statutes of 1874, had become 
generally outmoded on all subjects.”). 
 15. Harris, supra note 13, at 659. 
 16. Id. at 660. 
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Reflecting on these events much later, Giles Rich explained that 
two things irritated the patent bar and motivated the revisers.17 First 
was the invention requirement.18 Second was the patent misuse 
doctrine, which had effectively eliminated the patent law doctrine of 
contributory infringement.19 With respect to the first irritant, the 
invention requirement, Rich agreed with Harris: “The pressures to do 
something about this phantom requirement had been building up for 
some years because of a perceived antagonistic attitude on the part of 
the judiciary toward patents, frequently manifesting itself in holdings 
of invalidity for lack of ‘invention.’”20 Section 103, in particular, 
“came to be because many in the patent bar sensed a long-felt need for 
improvement.”21 
2. Problems Emanating from the Supreme Court  
Importantly, both of the irritants of the patent bar—the invention 
requirement and the patent misuse doctrine—emanated from the 
Supreme Court. As a result, statutory amendment appeared the only 
viable solution. 
a. The Invention Requirement  
The long-felt need for improvement with respect to the invention 
requirement resulted not just from the actions of courts and judges 
 
 17. Giles S. Rich, Giles S. Rich Addresses to the Giles Sutherland Rich 
American Inn of Court, 3 J. FED. CIR. HIST. SOC’Y 120, 127 (2009) (“[P]rior to 1948 
when I began this enterprise, there were two things that were bothering the patent 
bar.”). 
 18. See id. (“The first of them was called the requirement for ‘invention’: the 
way you determined when things [were] patentable and whether they were 
‘inventions’ or not, which is how the courts and lawyers determined whether things 
were before 1953.”). 
 19. See id. (“The other one was contributory infringement, which we in the 
Bar thought, at least in New York, had been abolished as a practical matter by the 
Supreme Court’s Mercoid decision[s] in 1944.”). With respect to contributory 
infringement, the problem was the Supreme Court’s Mercoid decisions, Mercoid 
Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Mercoid Corp. v. 
Minneapolis Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944), where “Justice Douglas said, in 
effect, ‘We acknowledge there is this ancient doctrine of contributory infringement 
which is very useful, but when there is misuse and these two doctrines conflict, misuse 
must prevail. It’s in the public interest.’” Rich, supra note 17, at 127–28. 
 20. Giles S. Rich, Why and How Section 103 Came to Be, in 
NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY, 1:206 (John F. 
Witherspoon ed., 1980). 
 21. Id. at 1:202. 
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generally, but from those of the Supreme Court specifically. The Court 
expressed an inability to provide guidance to lower courts and the 
Patent Office regarding how this requirement should be understood, 
but also paradoxically enforced the invention requirement with vigor 
to invalidate patent after patent. 
In 1891, the Supreme Court recognized its inability to provide 
guidance to lower courts and the Patent Office regarding this 
requirement.22 The Court went so far as admitting it could not provide 
guidance on how to distinguish between situations where the 
requirement was met and situations where it was not met: “The truth 
is the word [invention] cannot be defined in such manner as to afford 
any substantial aid in determining whether a particular device involves 
an exercise of the inventive faculty or not.”23 
But beyond admitting it could not provide guidance on how to 
enforce the invention requirement, the Supreme Court also repeatedly 
invalidated patents using it.24 The Court did so so frequently that 
Justice Jackson expressed his frustration in 1949 that “the only patent 
that is valid is one which this Court has not been able to get its hands 
on.”25 Rich later suggested that the “trend of discontent began with the 
Supreme Court’s 1941 decision invalidating the patent in Cuno 
Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.”26  
 
 22. See McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891). 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, 
J., dissenting) (noting the Supreme Court’s frequent invalidation of patents). 
 25. Id. (“It would not be difficult to cite many instances of patents that have 
been granted, improperly I think, and without adequate tests of invention by the Patent 
Office. But I doubt that the remedy for such Patent Office passion for granting patents 
is an equally strong passion in this Court for striking them down so that the only patent 
that is valid is one which this Court has not been able to get its hands on.”). 
 26. Rich, supra note 20, at 1:206 (citing Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic 
Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941)). The cause of this “trend of discontent” may be 
traced to President Roosevelt in 1938. As noted by George Frost, “[i]n 1938, President 
Roosevelt sent a message to the Congress suggesting that one cause of the continued 
economic malaise was the patent system.” George E. Frost, Judge Rich and the 1952 
Patent Code—A Retrospective, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 343, 343 (1994). 
President Roosevelt requested “a thorough study of the concentration of economic 
power in American industry and the effect of that concentration upon the decline of 
competition” and suggested “[a]mendment of the patent laws to prevent their use to 
suppress inventions, and to create industrial monopolies.” Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
Message to Congress on Curbing Monopolies (Apr. 29, 1938), 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/209657 [https://perma.cc/CK7X-WC2S]. A 
year later, in 1939, President Roosevelt nominated Justice Douglas to the Supreme 
Court. The author of the majority opinions in the Cuno and Mercoid decisions, and an 
important concurring opinion in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket 
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The Cuno decision certainly galvanized support for a legislative 
amendment addressing the invention requirement. In an opinion by 
Justice Douglas, the Court “used the expression ‘flash of creative 
genius’ in holding a patent invalid for lack of invention.”27 “This 
aroused considerable comment and many articles were written about 
the so-called new standard of invention, and even some lower courts 
were convinced that there had been a change.”28 “As usual, the patent 
bar overreacted with a flood of articles condemning the new ‘flash of 
genius’ requirement, which it assumed to be a more stringent test than 
mere ‘invention.’”29 The “impact of the Supreme Court’s expression 
was considerable,” so considerable that “[e]ventually various bills 
were introduced in Congress dealing with the subject.”30 
b. The Patent Misuse Doctrine  
The Supreme Court also created problems using the patent 
misuse doctrine. As explained in the Harvard Law Review in 1953: 
[I]n the last few decades the Court has been more sympathetic to the policy 
of the antitrust laws than tolerant of the limited monopoly granted by the 
patent laws. The gradual erosion of the doctrine of contributory 
infringement, the undermining of the . . . rule that a patentee can control his 
licensee’s resale price, and the intimations that abuse of the patent right is a 
per se violation of the antitrust laws, are indicative of the Court’s narrow 
view of the patent grant.31  
Each of these problems—erosion of contributory infringement, 
undermining the ability to control resale prices, and creation of per se 
antitrust violations—resulted from the Court’s decisions in the so-
called Mercoid cases in 1944 addressing the patent misuse doctrine.32 
 
Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950), Justice Douglas would do much to spur 
enactment of the Patent Act of 1952. 
 27. P.J. Federico, Origins of Section 103, 5 APLA Q.J. 87, 87 (1977). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Rich, supra note 20, at 1:206–07. 
 30. Federico, supra note 27, at 87.  
 31. Contributory Infringement and Misuse—The Effect of Section 271 of the 
Patent Act of 1952, 66 HARV. L. REV. 909, 918 (1953). Frost explains that “[b]y the 
end of the war, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice under an activist 
Assistant Attorney General had launched a major program against alleged patent 
abuses.” Frost, supra note 26, at 343. Moreover, “[t]he Supreme Court at that time 
was conspicuously anti-patent and became progressively more hostile through the 
1940’s.” Id. “The bottom line is that by about 1950 the Patent System was in real 
trouble, and the outlook was grim.” Id. 
 32. See generally Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 
(1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944).  
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In these opinions, also written by Justice Douglas, the Supreme 
Court “narrowed the doctrine of contributory infringement close to the 
vanishing point” using “decidedly critical” language.33 No doubt as a 
result, these decisions “reverberated through the discussions of patent 
lawyers of the time—all were shocked, many were uncertain on what 
it meant, and all agreed that the Court had gone too far.”34 As a result, 
“[b]ills relating to contributory infringement were also introduced in 
Congress.”35 
In short, by  
the late 1940s there was discontent in the patent bar. The practical value of 
patents was being downgraded. The courts were, on average, applying a too 
stringent test for “invention,” and the Supreme Court in the Mercoid cases 
virtually had eliminated the useful doctrine of contributory infringement by 
expanding the overriding misuse doctrine.36  
Something had to be done legislatively given these problems created 
by the Supreme Court. 
3. Lower Court and Patent Office Confusion 
While the Supreme Court created the problems, the impact of the 
confusion regarding the invention requirement fell on the lower courts 
and the Patent Office.37  
One of these lower court judges was Learned Hand.38 In a 1948 
dissent from a decision of the Second Circuit, Hand noted “the whole 
approach to the subject [of the invention requirement] has suffered a 
shift within the last decade or so, which [he] recognize[d] that [he] 
should accept as authoritative.”39 Nevertheless, he “confess[ed 
himself] baffled to know how to proceed,” if he was “at once to profess 
to apply the system as it is, and yet in every concrete instance . . . to 
decide as though it did not exist as it is.”40 Despite his confusion, he 
concluded that “so far as [he was] able to comprehend those factors 
 
 33. Frost, supra note 26, at 343–44. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Federico, supra note 27, at 87. 
 36. Giles S. Rich, Congressional Intent—or, Who Wrote the Patent Act of 
1952?, 1 PAT. PROCUREMENT & EXPLOITATION: PROTECTING INTELL. PROP. RTS. 61, 
63–64 (1963). 
 37. See, e.g., Harries v. Air King Products Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 
1950); see also Jungersen v. Baden, 166 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1948) (Hand, J., 
dissenting), rev’d sub nom. Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560 (1949). 
 38. See Jungersen, 166 F.2d at 812 (Hand, J., dissenting). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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which have been held to determine invention, and to which at least lip 
service continues to be paid, the combination in suit has every hall-
mark of a valid patent.”41 In 1949, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
majority’s decision to the contrary, but it was that case that elicited 
Justice Jackson’s statement that “the only patent that is valid is one 
which this Court has not been able to get its hands on.”42 Justice 
Jackson concluded his dissenting opinion with the statement that he 
“agree[d] with the opinion of Judge Learned Hand below.”43 Perhaps 
not surprisingly, in 1950, one year after the Supreme Court affirmed 
the majority’s decision invalidating the relevant patent, Hand authored 
another opinion, this one for a unanimous panel of the Second Circuit, 
calling the issue of “whether there is a patentable invention . . . . as 
fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and vague a phantom as exists in the 
whole paraphernalia of legal concepts . . . . If there be an issue more 
troublesome, or more apt for litigation than this, we are not aware of 
it.”44 
Many years later, Rich suggested that, beyond reviewing court 
decisions, “if you want to see how the ‘invention’ question was 
handled, look in texts such as Walker on Patents or Corpus Juris under 
the heading ‘Invention’ where you will find a couple of dozen factors 
listed for determining the presence or absence of this phantom.”45 I did 
just that.  
I reviewed Walker on Patents, Deller’s Edition, published in 
1937, with its pocket supplement dated 1949.46 Its section on the 
invention requirement spans no less than 144 pages, describing—
primarily with long quotations from numerous cases—various aspects 
of the requirement. The section addressing the invention requirement 
begins with an attempt to describe the requirement generally.47 
According to the author, it required “creative mental conception as 
distinguished from the ordinary faculties of reasoning upon materials 
supplied by a special knowledge, and the facility of manipulation 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Jungersen, 335 U.S. at 572 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950). Later, 
after enactment of the Patent Act of 1952, Hand, reflecting on the previous era, 
remarked that “‘invention’ became perhaps the most baffling concept in the whole 
catalogue of judicial efforts to provide postulates for indefinitely varying occasions.” 
Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224 F.2d 530, 536 (2d Cir. 1955). 
 45. Rich, supra note 20, at 1:208. 
 46. See generally WALKER ON PATENTS 109–253 (Deller’s ed. 1937 & Supp. 
1949). 
 47. See id. at 109–11. 
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which results from its habitual and intelligent practice by those skilled 
in the art.”48 The author also stated, circularly, that invention “must be 
the product of some exercise of the inventive faculties.”49 These 
descriptions highlight the lack of clarity regarding how the invention 
requirement was met. 
Judge Rich’s suggestion, however, referenced the factors 
identified in Walker on Patents, and there were many.50 The treatise 
described a first set of initial factors as “considered in determining 
invention” or “evidence of invention”: 
 
•     character, condition, or progress of art to which invention      
       relates, long-felt want, and nature of want supplied; 
•     utility, economy, efficiency, or other advantage; 
•     long experimentation, prompt and general adoption,  
       recognition of validity of patent; 
•     turning failure into success, the last step wins; and 
•     successful efforts of patentee after failure of others.51 
 
After listing these factors, Walker on Patents resorted to definition by 
example, listing many “specific cases illustrating determination of 
presence or absence of invention.”52 The author summed up the 
analysis of these cases by highlighting the lack of any positive 
governing guideline—“there is no affirmative rule by which to 
determine the presence or absence of invention in every case”—and 
instead introducing a list of negative rules indicating what does not 
constitute invention: 
[I]t has been settled that the ideal line which separates things invented from 
things otherwise produced can never be concisely defined; and that there is 
no affirmative rule by which to determine the presence or absence of 
invention in every case; and that such questions are to be determined by 
means of several negative rules which operated by a process of exclusion. 
Each of those rules applies to a large class of cases, and all of them are 
entirely authoritative and sufficiently clear. To formulate those rules, and to 
state their qualifications and exceptions, and to classify and cite the 
adjudged cases from which those rules, qualifications, and exceptions are 
deducible, is the scope of several sections which follow.53 
 
 48. Id. at 111. 
 49. Id. at 113. 
 50. See Rich, supra note 20, at 1:208. 
 51. See WALKER ON PATENTS, supra note 46, at 119–124.  
 52. Id. at 124. 
 53. Id. at 136. 
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These negative rules included the following propositions (among 
others), which I understand Rich to have considered to be additional 
factors: 
 
•     Mere skill is not invention; 
•     It is not invention to substitute superior for inferior  
       materials; 
•     It is not invention to so enlarge and strengthen a machine  
       that it will operate on larger materials than before; 
•     It is not invention to change the size or degree of a thing, or  
       of any feature or function of a machine or manufacture; 
•     Where a change of form is within the domain of mere  
       construction, it is not invention; and 
•     Mere reversal of parts, producing no new result, does not  
       constitute invention.54 
 
Other listed prima facie exclusions include “unification or 
multiplication of parts,” “portable devices,” “manual converted to 
mechanical operation,” “change of proportion,” “duplication of parts,” 
“omission of parts,” “substitution of equivalents,” “combinations,” 
“aggregation,” and “new use.”55 A factor indicative of the presence of 
an invention was saved for last: commercial success.56 
The definitions, factors, and negative rules in Walker on Patents 
indicated a lack of clarity regarding how to apply the invention 
requirement in any positive manner other than to distinguish between 
creativity and the ordinary faculties of reasoning by those skilled in 
the relevant field of technology by considering all of the relevant 
circumstances. Perhaps even more salient, though, was the pocket 
supplement and, specifically, the portion collecting all of the cases 
addressing the invention requirement and separating them into those 
finding invention and those finding no invention.57  
Two things associated with the pocket supplement stand out. 
First, in the section covering the invention requirement, the first entry 
declared that “[t]he quality which constitutes invention is 
 
 54. See id. at 138, 179, 187, 189, 194–95. 
 55. Id. at 196, 198–99, 205, 207, 209, 211, 218, 226. 
 56. See id. at 234. 
 57. See id. at 71–90 (Supp. 1949). It is perhaps telling that the earliest case 
in either list is the Supreme Court’s decision in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 
(1850). See id. at 246. 
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indefinable.”58 Second, more remarkable was the update to the lists of 
cases finding either an invention or no invention. The pocket 
supplement collected cases between 1937 and 1949. The list of cases 
finding an invention during that time period spanned about four pages, 
while the list of cases during that time period finding no invention 
spanned about fifteen pages.59 The pages contained hundreds of 
citations. These lists, moreover, separately identified Supreme Court 
cases. The lists indicated during that time period the Supreme Court 
found only one patent compliant with the invention requirement, while 
eighteen times found a patent in violation of the invention 
requirement.60 Thus, while confusion in the lower courts reigned, the 
outcome of disputes generally—and particularly at the Supreme 
Court—overwhelmingly favored the invalidation of patents as not 
meeting the invention requirement. 
I also reviewed the 1951 edition of the Corpus Juris text 
referenced by Rich.61 It too included a separate section devoted to the 
invention requirement, this one spanning a full 100 pages.62 Like 
Walker on Patents, Corpus Juris, with a similar preliminary 
qualification, attempted to define in positive terms the requirement of 
invention. After conceding that “[t]he word ‘invention’ is not 
susceptible of precise definition,” it stated that, “[i]n general, 
invention requires the exercise of inventive or creative faculties, and 
a complete invention necessitates not only a mental act but also the 
reduction of the idea to practice.”63 Buried deep in this treatise, 
however, one can also find a description of a nonobviousness 
requirement: “The test generally applied in distinguishing invention 
from mechanical skill is whether what was produced was obvious to 
persons skilled in the art and acquainted with the common knowledge 
in that art at the date the art or instrument was created.”64 Corpus Juris 
went on to explain that,  
[i]f the solution of the problem demonstrated by the method or device 
claimed to have been invented was obvious or would readily occur to those 
 
 58. Id. at 13 (Supp. 1949) (quoting Warren Telechron Co. v. Waltham Watch 
Co., 91 F.2d 472, 473 (1st Cir. 1937)). 
 59. Compare id. at 71–75 with id. at 75–90. 
 60. Compare id. at 71 with id. at 75–76. The latter list of cases, of course, 
includes Cuno and Jungersen, discussed above. 
 61. See 69 C.J.S. Patents §§ 50–70 (1951). 
 62. See id. (evidencing that §§ 50–70 on the invention requirement span from 
pages 247 to 346). Compare this to novelty (53 pages) and utility (6 pages). See id. §§ 
19–42, 43–49. 
 63. Id. § 53(a). 
 64. Id. § 55. 
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skilled in the art to which it relates at the time of its conception, its 
production is held to involve only mechanical skill and not invention.65  
But in addition to these statements there are numerous, indeed 
hundreds, of other statements attempting to identify what qualifies or 
does not qualify as an invention.66 The statements of what do not 
constitute invention resembled those discussed in Walker on Patents 
(e.g., duplication of parts, omission of parts, making parts integral or 
separate).67 But Corpus Juris also identified “Particular Facts 
Evidencing Invention or Lack Thereof”: novelty, utility, commercial 
success, satisfaction of long-felt want, unsuccessful efforts of others, 
public acquiescence in validity, imitation, experiments, and 
independent production by others.68 
In the end, these texts identified so many descriptions, factors, 
and negative rules that it is unsurprising that decisionmakers felt 
unconstrained. Rich recalled that, “in general, judges did whatever 
they felt like doing according to whatever it was that gave the judge 
his feelings—out of the evidence coupled with his past mental 
conditioning—and then selected those precedents which supported his 
conclusions.”69 Moreover, “Patent Office examiners and Board of 
Appeals members did the same.”70 
4. Identification of the Need for Reform  
While in the patent community there was a long-felt need for 
reform based on the problems created by the Supreme Court and 
unleashed on (and through) the lower courts and the Patent Office, the 
significance of these problems likely first resonated with the political 
branches of the government upon publication of the first “Kettering 
Report.”71 Just five days after the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, 
President Roosevelt issued an Executive Order establishing the 
National Patent Planning Commission and authorized it “to conduct a 
comprehensive survey and study of the American patent system” and 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. §§ 50–70. 
 67. See id. § 55. 
 68. Id. § 70(d). 
 69. Rich, supra note 20, at 1:208. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See CHARLES F. KETTERING, THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM: REPORT OF 
THE NATIONAL PATENT PLANNING COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 78-239 (1943) 
[hereinafter Kettering Report]. 
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to determine whether the system might be improved.72 President 
Roosevelt named Charles F. Kettering, an inventor and the director of 
General Motors research, as the Chairman of the Commission.73 
In its first report, transmitted to Congress on June 18, 1943, the 
Commission made several findings and recommendations.74 For 
purposes of the present discussion, it is significant to note three. First, 
the report found as “[t]he most serious weakness in the present patent 
system . . . the lack of a uniform test or standard for determining 
whether the particular contribution of an inventor merits the award of 
the patent grant.”75 Stated alternatively, the Commission took the 
position that “[o]ne of the greatest technical weaknesses of the patent 
system is the lack of a definitive yardstick as to what is invention.”76 
The Commission explained that, beyond novelty and utility, “[t]here 
must also be present some mysterious ingredient connoted in the term 
‘invented.’”77 “The difficulty,” the Commission noted, “is that there is 
no accepted uniform standard among [the] several tribunals which can 
be applied in the same or similar cases.”78 Beyond highlighting the 
lack of a uniform standard, however, the Commission also found the 
problem to be significant.79 The Commission stated that “[n]o other 
feature of our law is more destructive to the purpose of the patent 
system than this existing uncertainty as to the validity of a patent,” and 
“[t]he present confusion threatens the usefulness of the whole patent 
system and calls for an immediate and effective remedy.”80 Finally, 
 
 72. Id. at VII. The Executive Order authorized the Commission 
to conduct a comprehensive survey and study of the American patent 
system, and consider whether the system now provides the maximum 
service in stimulating the inventive genius of our people in evolving 
inventions and in furthering their prompt utilization for the public good; 
whether our patent system should perform a more active function in 
inventive development; whether there are obstructions in our existing 
system of patent laws, and if so, how they can be eliminated; to what 
extent the Government should go in stimulating inventive effort in normal 
times; and what methods and plans might be developed to promote 
inventions and discoveries which will increase commerce, provide 
employment, and fully utilize expanded defense industrial facilities 
during normal times. 
Id. 
 73. See id.; see also Rich, supra note 20, at 1:207. 
 74. See Kettering Report, supra note 71. 
 75. Id. at 5. 
 76. Id. at 10. 
 77. Id. at 5. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. Id. at 462–63. 
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the Commission suggested legislation would be appropriate and 
recommended a particular legislative solution.81 “A promising 
improvement,” explained the Commission, “would be for Congress, 
by legislative enactment, to lay down a reasonable, understandable test 
by which inventions shall be judged both from the standpoint of the 
grant of the patent and the validity of the patent thereafter.”82 As for 
its proposal, the Commission recommended “the enactment of a 
declaration of policy that patentability shall be determined objectively 
by the nature of the contribution to the advancement of the art, and not 
subjectively by the nature of the process by which the invention may 
have been accomplished.”83 
The Commission later issued second and third reports in January 
and September 1945 respectively.84 The third report addressed the 
patent misuse doctrine, on which the Supreme Court had focused in 
the Mercoid cases in the intervening year and a half since the 
Commission’s first report.85 The Commission effectively expressed its 
disagreement with the Court’s handling of the patent misuse doctrine, 
stating that “the Commission feels that the prevention or penalization 
of . . . wrongful use should not jeopardize the patent itself nor incur a 
departure from the sound principle of patent protection.”86 
5. Sense of Urgency  
While the Kettering Report laid the groundwork for later reform 
efforts by communicating to the President and Congress in clear terms 
some of the problems caused by the Supreme Court and the need for 
legislative action with respect to the invention requirement, ultimately 
a sense of urgency motivated the patent community to lobby Congress. 
Two of the Court’s cases created this urgency. 
 
 81. See id. at 463. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id.  
 84. See CHARLES F. KETTERING, GOVERNMENT-OWNED PATENTS AND 
INVENTIONS OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS: SECOND REPORT OF 
THE NATIONAL PATENT PLANNING COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 22 (1st Sess. 1945); 
CHARLES F. KETTERING, THIRD REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PATENT PLANNING 
COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 283 (1st Sess. 1945) [hereinafter Third Kettering 
Report]. 
 85. See generally Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 
(1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944). 
 86. Third Kettering Report, supra note 84, at 603. 
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The first case, which I have already discussed, was Cuno 
Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp. in 1941.87 The patent 
community so disagreed with Justice Douglas’s “flash of creative 
genius” test it “drove patent lawyers up the wall”88 and created a long-
simmering “sense of urgency that something be done.”89 Thus, “[t]he 
atmosphere having become charged up with discontent like a 
thunderstorm, two bills were introduced in the 79th and 80th 
Congresses and hearings were held on them in 1948 and 1949.”90 
The second case galvanizing the patent community was Great 
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp.—yet 
another case decided with a problematic opinion by Justice Douglas, 
this one a concurring one—in 1950.91 Rich later explained that “what 
persuaded the Coordinating Committee to replace the case law with a 
statutory provision was the Supreme Court’s opinion, and Mr. Justice 
Douglas’s concurring opinion [in the case, which were] published in 
the New York Times on the very day in 1950 the [Drafting] Committee 
was having a meeting.”92 Indeed, Rich remembered that day vividly 
because he read the opinions aloud to the Drafting Committee, the 
small group of patent lawyers working on reform legislation, and it 
was the Court’s language, not so much its decision, that motivated the 
reformers.93 In the words of George Frost, “[t]he ruling, and 
particularly a vitriolic opinion castigating the Patent Office, was 
something of a bombshell. The event convinced the [Coordinating] 
Committee that the codification bill had to retain a section addressing 
what was then the requirement for ‘invention,’ even at the risk of 
jeopardizing passage of the bill.”94 Indeed, the Court’s “reasoning is 
what clinched the decision to enact a statutory substitute that would 
make more sense, would apply to all kinds of inventions, would 
 
 87. See Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941). 
 88. Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the “Invention” Requirement, 1 
AIPLA Q.J. 24, 30 (1972). 
 89. Harris, supra note 13, at 674. 
 90. Rich, supra note 20, at 1:208. 
 91. Federico, supra note 27, at 95 (citing Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. 
Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)) (“The A&P case[,] . . . which was 
decided by the Supreme Court on Dec. 4, 1950, also served to stimulate some of this 
activity.”). 
 92. Rich, supra note 88, at 32. 
 93. See id. (“The decision may have been all right, but we considered what 
was said in the opinions to be typical of all that was wrong with the patent law’s 
‘invention’ requirement.”). 
 94. See Frost, supra note 26, at 346; see also Rich, supra note 36, at 70 (“I 
have always felt that it clinched the determination to include in the bill what is now 
35 U.S.C. § 103, in order to get rid of the vague requirement of ‘invention.’”). 
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restrict the courts in their arbitrary, a priori judgments on 
patentability, and that, above all, would serve as a uniform standard 
of patentability.”95 While the nonobviousness requirement already 
appeared in the pending legislation, “there was . . . a small faction in 
favor of leaving things as they were, with no statutory provision on 
the subject and the determination of the presence or absence of 
‘invention’ left entirely to the courts with no statutory guide or 
standard.”96 The opinions in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. 
Supermarket Equipment Corp., however, “clinched the determination 
to include in the bill what is now 35 U.S.C. § 103, in order to get rid 
of the vague requirement of ‘invention.’”97 
B. Involvement of the Patent Bar 
Another factor that led to the success of the legislative reform 
was the involvement of the patent bar.98 Both Congressmen99 and 
patent lawyers100 recognized the need for the involvement of the bar. 
As a result, the Patent Act of 1952 “was written basically . . . by patent 
lawyers drawn from the Patent Office, from industry, from private 
practice, and from some government departments.”101 These authors, 
“in turn, drew upon the combined judgment of organizations of patent 
lawyers in a most remarkable way. They got the bill together, refined 
it, and presented it to the legislature to be enacted.”102 Leaders 
emerged, conducted scholarly research, exercised good judgment, 
drafted clear legislation, and organized and consolidated the interests 
of the bar.103 
 
 95. See Rich, supra note 88, at 33. 
 96. See Rich, supra note 36, at 70. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See id. at 65. 
 99. Id. (“I fear some of my legal brethren back home, patent lawyers, 
knowing that I would never take a patent case in my life, would shudder a little if I 
were to sit in judgment on a problem of this nature. . . . We would, necessarily, rely 
on a staff, on a competent and sufficient staff to do the spade work.”). 
 100. Rich, supra note 17, at 126 (“The National Council of Patent Law 
Association were told about this by Federico and said, ‘We had [better] get aboard. 
We don’t want the Patent Office solely writing this bill. The Patent Bar had better [be] 
in it.’”); id. at 130 (“The Patent Bar felt that wasn’t too good either, and thought that 
because it doesn’t see things just the way the Patent Office does all the time, maybe 
the Patent Bar had better get involved in this.”). 
 101. Rich, supra note 36, at 73. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See id. 
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1. Leadership 
Several individuals emerged to lead the effort that led to 
enactment of the Patent Act of 1952.104 Four in particular, Henry “Red” 
Ashton, P.J. “Pat” Federico, Giles Rich, and Paul Rose “deserve 
respect and credit not only for those endless hours that went into the 
effort, but equally for the judgments that led to passage of” the Act.105 
“They indeed accomplished what was nearly impossible—restoration 
of the patent law to substantially the condition that existed before the 
administrative and judicial onslaught of the 1940s.”106 
a. Henry Ashton 
Ashton led the effort to reform the patent system. A lawyer at 
the firm of Fish, Richardson, and Neave in New York, Ashton served 
as the President of the American Patent Law Association and, as a 
result, automatically as Chairman of the National Council of Patent 
Law Associations.107 “At that time the National Council did little 
beyond supporting a legislative information service for its members—
the two dozen regional patent law associations whose presidents were 
the council.”108 Ashton, however, saw a new role for the National 
Council when, in November 1949, Federico showed him a draft of the 
patent reform legislation.109 He called a meeting of the National 
Council of Patent Law Associations to try to coordinate the efforts of 
the various associations with respect to Federico’s amendments.110 
As Rich recalls, the first meeting took place on February 8, 1950, 
with twenty-three people present “representing 17 patent law 
associations, from Los Angeles to Boston.”111 Orchestrated by Ashton, 
“[t]wo things were done, according to a well-conceived plan.”112 
“First, those present or designated alternates were constituted a 
Coordinating Committee,”113 which in general terms would “help the 
Congress draft a new Patent Act.”114 Second, a “two-man Drafting 
 
 104. See Frost, supra note 26, at 356. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Rich, supra note 17, at 130. 
 108. Rich, supra note 36, at 66.  
 109. See id. 
 110. See id. at 67. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Rich, supra note 17, at 130.  
 Patent Reform, Then and Now 451 
Committee [would] be appointed,” with Ashton designating “Paul 
Rose and Giles Rich to be that committee.”115 
While not formally part of the Drafting Committee, Ashton 
became a “virtual third member,” participating in revision work and 
meeting with Federico in Washington to consolidate ideas.116 Indeed, 
when the Drafting Committee met, “it always included Henry Ashton, 
Pat Federico, and usually two or three others, including House 
subcommittee counsel Murray Bernhardt or later L. James (Lou) 
Harris.”117 Ashton also testified in Congress, giving the main 
presentation for the Coordinating Committee.118 Then, after passage of 
the Act, Ashton and Rich drafted the Revision Notes.119 
Rich later credited Ashton for being instrumental in passage of 
the Act.120 In his words, “it . . . would not have been passed by now if 
it hadn’t been for our good friend, Henry Ashton, Chairman of the 
Coordinating Committee, who kept everyone working until final 
passage on the 4th of July, 1952.”121 
b. P.J. Federico 
Federico served as the principal draftsperson of the Patent Act 
of 1952.122 He ended up serving in that role after a long period during 
which he gained significant experience in the field of patent law and 
in law reform efforts.123 A patent examiner, Federico began serving as 
an Associate Editor of the Patent Office Society Journal in 1932 and 
became its Editor-in-Chief in 1935.124 The same year, 1935, he became 
Assistant Chief of Division 43 of the Patent Office; in 1940 he became 
a “Principal Examiner,” i.e., Chief of the Division; in 1946 he became 
a Law Examiner; and in 1947 he became an “Examiner-in-Chief 
 
 115. Rich, supra note 36, at 67–68; see also Rich, supra note 17, at 130.  
 116. Rich, supra note 36, at 68–69.  
 117. Rich, supra note 20, at 1:211. 
 118. See Frost, supra note 26, at 345; Patent Law Codification and Revision: 
Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d 
Cong. 21 (1951) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 3760]. 
 119. See Rich, supra note 36, at 73. 
 120. See Giles S. Rich, The New York Patent Law Association, 3 J. FED. CIR. 
HIST. SOC’Y 104, 115 (2009). 
 121. Id.  
 122. See Giles S. Rich, P.J. (Pat) Federico and His Works, 64 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 3, 5 (1982). 
 123. See id. 
 124. See id. at 4. As part of his work, Federico published a book 
commemorating the centennial of the Patent Act of 1836, authoring several chapters. 
See id. 
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which made him a member of the Board of Appeals, the position and 
title he retained until he retired in May 1970.”125 
Prior to his work on what became the Patent Act of 1952, 
Federico participated in numerous efforts to reform intellectual 
property law.126 In 1943 he chaired a committee to revise the Rules of 
Practice in Patent Cases, and in 1947 he chaired another committee to 
revise the Trademark Rules of Practice.127 His law reform work even 
extended overseas to West Germany following World War II when he 
helped that country to rewrite its patent law.128 Back in the United 
States, he ultimately became “the man who was sent up to the 
Congress whenever bills affecting the patent system were given 
hearings; he was the man who gave technical advice about patent laws, 
here and abroad, to the State Department.”129  
Federico ultimately “was the man, when the time finally came, 
who single-handedly drafted the first version of the Patent Act of 
1952.”130 He testified in support of the legislation,131 later drafted the 
House and Senate Reports relating to the legislation,132 and after its 
passage compiled and published his “‘Commentary on the New Patent 
Act,’ which appear[ed] as the preface to the U.S. Code Annotated, 
Title 35.”133 According to Federico, the Commentary “should be 
considered only as a survey of the patent statute, with the main 
objective of pointing out the changes which have been made by the 
new act.”134 That said, the Commentary proved to be an important 
resource to courts as they sought to understand the intentions of the 
drafters of the Patent Act of 1952.135 
 
 125. Id. The Patent Office in those days gave the title of “Examiner-in-Chief” 
to members of the then-Patent Board of Appeals. John H. Barton, Non-Obviousness, 
43 IDEA 475, 485 (2003). 
 126. See Rich, supra note 122, at 4. 
 127. See id.  
 128. See id. at 5.  
 129. Id.  
 130. Id.  
 131. See Hearings on H.R. 3760, supra note 118. 
 132. See Rich, supra note 36, at 73. 
 133. Federico, supra note 27, at 97. 
 134. Federico, supra note 14, at 162 (republishing Federico’s Commentary). 
 135. Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (“Shortly after the passage of the Act, 
P.J. Federico, one of its original drafters, gave a series of lectures across the country 
to educate patent groups about the new Act. The lectures were transcribed, edited, and 
published. Prior to publication, Federico ‘submitted drafts of the commentary to 
[Henry] Ashton and the Drafting Committee for suggestions . . . .’ The Drafting 
Committee consisted of Judge Giles S. Rich, late of this court, and Paul Rose. 
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No doubt Federico filled his leadership role in reform efforts 
because of his experience and seniority at the Patent Office combined 
with his law reform expertise. But he also served in this role because, 
according to Rich, “nobody had a more profound knowledge of the 
subject than” Federico, who was a “veritable archeologist of patent 
law.”136 This would prove the perfect combination of experience given 
that the House counsel requested his assistance both codifying existing 
patent law and amending it as appropriate.137  
Rich later declared that “a monument ought to be erected to Mr. 
P.J. Federico of the Patent Office for the work that he did on this law 
over the years and the contributions he made from his vast knowledge 
of patent law.”138 In a similar vein, Rich also sought to give Federico 
recognition for his labor over the years in government service, 
declaring that “[p]oliticians may come and politicians may go and in 
the process get most of the publicity in governmental affairs, but it is 
people like Pat who make government work.”139 
c. Giles S. Rich 
Rich grew up around patent law.140 His father practiced patent 
law in Rochester, New York, where his “most famous client was 
George Eastman, founder of the Eastman Kodak Company.”141 Indeed, 
“[t]he bustling industrial city of Rochester and the law offices of 
Church and Rich formed the backdrop of the bulk of . . . Rich’s 
childhood.”142 “As a child, [Rich] would talk to draftsmen, inspect 
models, and learn how to make patent drawings,” and “[o]ne of his 
main pleasures as a youth was touring . . . factories and seeing 
manufacturing processes first hand.”143 
In 1929, Rich joined his father’s firm, then called Williams, Rich 
& Morse and located in New York City, where Rich practiced both 
 
Federico’s commentary is an invaluable insight into the intentions of the drafters of 
the Act.”).  
 136. Rich, supra note 122, at 5. 
 137. See Rich, supra note 36, at 65–66. 
 138. Rich, supra note 120, at 115. 
 139. Rich, supra note 122, at 3. 
 140. See Philip C. Swain, A Brief Biography of Giles Sutherland Rich, 3 J. 
FED. CIR. HIST. SOC’Y 9, 10 (2009). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 10–11. 
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patent prosecution and patent litigation.144 Rich also served as a 
member of the Patent Law and Practice Committee of the New York 
Patent Law Association.145 As part of that committee, in the late 1940s 
he “played a critical role” in “drafting a bill to revive the doctrine of 
contributory infringement” after the Supreme Court’s Mercoid 
decisions.146 He had previously written a treatise-like five-part article 
addressing the issues that ended up underlying the Mercoid case,147 
and he also served as an adjunct professor of patent law at Columbia 
University.148 
In November 1949, Rich was one of the few individuals Federico 
showed an early draft of the patent reform legislation.149 Later, when 
the House subcommittee decided to print what were called the 
“Federico amendments” to the patent law, Alexander C. Neave, who 
had recently become chairman of the Patent Law and Practice 
Committee of the New York Patent Law Association, a post Rich had 
relinquished after two years, learned that Henry Ashton intended to 
call a meeting of the National Council of Patent Law Associations.150 
Neave notified Worthington Campbell, then-President of the New 
York Patent Law Association, that “it would be also desirable for Giles 
Rich to go because he was able to go over the draft when it was left 
[in New York City] by Mr. Federico, which was at a time when I was 
so jammed up that I could not do it.”151  
 
 144. Id. at 14. During his time practicing in New York City, Rich wrote twice 
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 149. See Rich, supra note 36, at 66.  
 150. Id. at 67. 
 151. Id. (quoting Letter from A. Neave to W. Campbell). Rich had previously 
been the person at NYPLA “responsible for explaining to Congressional committees 
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overrule the Supreme Court’s Mercoid cases that effectively abolished the doctrine of 
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As discussed above, at the first meeting of the National Council 
Rich became a member of both the Coordinating Committee and the 
Drafting Committee.152 He served in this role for the next two-and-a-
half years.153 In addition to his work on the Drafting Committee, he 
testified in favor of the legislation.154 Moreover, as explained by Philip 
Swain, 
[t]wo crucial features of the Patent Act of 1952 owe their origins to Rich’s 
work on the Drafting Committee. First, Rich was instrumental in reviving 
the law of contributory infringement and restraining the law of patent 
misuse through Sections 271(b), (c), and (d) of the Patent Act. Second, and 
perhaps more importantly in the long run, it was Rich’s idea to replace the 
definition of ‘invention’ with ‘nonobviousness’ in Section 103 of the 
statute, which creates as an objective test for patentability.155 
In short, Rich is credited for the success of the Patent Act of 1952 in 
correcting patent law’s two most significant problems, the patent 
misuse doctrine and the invention requirement.156 But it was drafting 
§ 103 to eliminate the invention requirement that was later deemed his 
greatest accomplishment, and the one in which he took the most 
pride.157 
 
The NYIPLA as His Springboard, 3 J. FED. CIR. HIST. SOC’Y 101, 102 (2009). It was 
during these years he learned of another bill to define the invention requirement. Rich, 
supra note 17, at 125 (“It became my duty to come down to Washington and explain 
this bill [on contributory infringement] to committees in successive Congresses over 
two or three years, which I did. Somebody else had hatched up a bill to define the 
term, ‘invention,’ in what was the ‘requirement for invention’ in those days.”). During 
1950 and 1951, Rich served as the organization’s President. See Carlson, supra at 102. 
 152. See Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearings Before Subcomm. 
no. 3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R. 23, 82d Cong. (1951) [hereinafter Hearings 
on H.R. 23]. 
 153. See Rich, supra note 36, at 68. 
 154. See Hearings on H.R. 23, supra note 152. 
 155. Swain, supra note 140, at 19; see also Giles S. Rich, Giles S. Rich’s 
Speech at the 75th Annual Dinner of the NYIPLA, 3 J. FED. CIR. HIST. SOC’Y 134, 
134–35 (2009) (“[I]t was this association[,] . . . through what was then called the 
Committee on Patent Law and Practice of the then NYPLA, on which I was servicing, 
that conceived of the idea of replacing the requirement of ‘invention’ with a defined 
nonobviousness provision and putting it in the statute.”). 
 156. Special Session of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, In Honor of the Honorable Giles S. Rich, 137 J. FED. CIR. HIST. SOC’Y 137, 
146 (2009) (“Judge Rich, in reality, was the creator and the author of the key 
provisions . . . which were Section 103, Obviousness, and Section 271, Infringement 
of Patent . . . .”) [hereinafter Special Session]. 
 157. Neil A. Smith, Remembrances and Memorial: Judge Giles S. Rich, 1904–
1999, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 909, 913 (1999) (“By far Judge Rich’s great 
accomplishment, and there were many, in which he took the most pride, was drafting 
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Rich eventually became a judge on the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals and, later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit.158 For his contributions to the patent system, he was named 
“the father of modern patent law,”159 “the most famous patent jurist in 
the world,”160 “perhaps the greatest patent jurist ever,”161 the 
“preeminent patent lawyer, jurist, scholar, student of patent law 
ever,”162 and, simply, “Mr. Patent Law.”163 Senator Orrin Hatch said of 
Rich that he “contributed as much, if not more, than anyone else in 
[the twentieth] century to the development of U.S. patent policy and 
the promotion of American innovation.”164 
d. Paul Rose 
Compared to the others who led the successful effort to enact the 
Patent Act of 1952, less is known about Rose. A Washington patent 
attorney working as senior counsel for Union Carbide Corporation, 
Rose served as the Patent Law Revision Committee Chairman of the 
American Patent Law Association during the time in question.165 He 
also served as an adjunct professor of patent law at George 
 
Section 103 of the new Patent Act, which defined the standard of non-obviousness in 
the patent law.”). 
 158. See Donald R. Dunner, Giles Sutherland Rich, 9 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 71, 72 
(1999). 
 159. Janice Mueller, A Rich Legacy, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 755, 
756 (1999). 
 160. See Swain, supra note 140, at 9.  
 161. See Dunner, supra note 158, at 73. 
 162. Bart Barnes, Giles S. Rich Dies at 95, WASH. POST (June 11, 1999), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1999/06/11/giles-s-rich-dies-at-
95/cef021c8-cddd-40f6-b647-ad37785e131c/?noredirect=on&utm_term=. 
4dc2e241bf71 [https://perma.cc/UTV4-VPJ5] (reporting statement of Donald R. 
Dunner); see also Special Session, supra note 156, at 138 (reporting statement of 
Chief Justice Rehnquist that Rich “was widely regarded as one of the preeminent 
patent law jurists in the country”). 
 163. Swain, supra note 140, at 25; see also Barton, supra note 125, at 489 
(stating that “[t]he Supreme Court’s position is clearly not that of Judge Rich” and 
criticizing his views). That is not to say that everyone agreed with Judge Rich’s 
stewardship of the law of non-obviousness.  
 164. Orrin Hatch, Tribute to Judge Rich, 3 J. FED. CIR. HIST. SOC’Y 152, 152 
(2009). 
 165. Rich, supra note 20, at 1:211; Rich, supra note 17, at 131–32; Carlson, 
supra note 148; Charles E. Miller & Daniel P. Archibald, Beware the Suppression of 
District-Court Jurisdiction of Administrative Decisions in Patent-Validity Challenges 
Under the America Invents Act, 95 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 124, 134 n.33 
(2013). 
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Washington University.166 As discussed above, Rose joined with Rich 
on the two-man Drafting Committee formed by the Coordinating 
Committee of the National Council of Patent Law Associations.167 In 
this role he reviewed Federico’s draft legislation, proposed changes, 
and met with Federico, Rich, and Ashton to consolidate their ideas.168 
He also testified in support of the legislation on behalf of the American 
Patent Law Association.169 
e. Others 
Other members of the patent bar contributed to the success of the 
reform movement. George E. Folk, for example, the retired head of 
the AT&T Patent Department and Patent Advisor to the National 
Manufacturers Association, as well as his assistant Fred Foulk, 
provided great help to the Coordinating Committee.170 And while the 
leaders of the reform movement came from the patent bar, others also 
contributed. Several Congressmen, for example, played pivotal roles 
in obtaining passage of the Patent Act of 1952. Representative Joseph 
Bryson served as Chairman of the House Committee on Patents, 
Trademarks, and Copyrights and introduced various versions of 
legislation into Congress.171 Senator Alexander Wiley ensured that the 
Bill passed the Senate on the consent calendar on the last day of the 
term in 1952.172 Various other members of the government played 
important roles in the process that led up to the enactment. Charles 
Zinn, for example, served as the Law Revision Counsel of the House 
Subcommittee, and he and C. Murray Bernhardt, another 
 
 166. Carlson, supra note 148. 
 167. Rich, supra note 36, at 67–68. 
 168. Id. at 68–69; Rich, supra note 17, at 131–32. 
 169. Frost, supra note 26, at 345; Hearings on H.R. 3760, supra note 118. 
 170. See Rich, supra note 17, at 131 (“[T]he Coordinating Committee was 
augmented by representatives of other Associations in the National Council, a lot of 
other people like the Army and the Navy, the Aircraft Manufacturers Association, and 
most importantly the NAM[,] . . . which had a Patent Committee. The NAM took a 
very great interest in the work and the Chairman of their Patent Committee, sort of by 
custom, was the retired head of the AT&T Patent Department . . . . His name was 
George E. Folk and he had an assistant he brought to all of the meetings too. His name 
was Fred Foulk. They were of great help because they had lots of dough and they 
reproduced everything that we wanted reproduced, mimeographing, and doing 
revisions of the bill, time after time.”); George E. Folk, The Relation of Patents to the 
Antitrust Laws, 13 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 278, 278 n.* (1948) (providing biographical 
details about George E. Folk). 
 171. See Federico, supra note 27, at 93, 95. 
 172. See Rich, supra note 17, at 132. 
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subcommittee counsel, had the good judgment to put patent reform on 
the agenda and request Federico’s assistance.173 Zinn contributed to 
the simplicity of the language in the legislation174 and later wrote a 
commentary on the Act.175 The Commissioner of Patents, Lawrence C. 
Kingsland, had the good judgment to give Federico six months or 
longer to serve as a technical assistant to the House Committee and 
write the legislation.176 Bernhardt and later Harris (who also served as 
subcommittee counsel) often met with the Drafting Committee to join 
in their work.177 Harris also later published his own article describing 
the intent behind the Act.178 
2. Scholarly Research 
A significant contribution of the patent bar to the reform effort 
involved scholarly research. At the center of this research stood 
Federico. Even as an Associate Examiner, Federico conducted 
research and wrote papers on the history of the U.S. patent system.179 
But his most important work with respect to the reform efforts related 
specifically to the invention requirement.  
In 1950, Federico published an article in the Journal of the 
Patent Office Society entitled The Concept of Patentable Invention.180 
This article plumbed the depths of the history of the invention 
requirement and, in some respects, turned common knowledge on its 
head.181 In the face of the prevailing view that the invention 
requirement derived its force from the use of the term “invention” in 
either the Constitution or the statute, Federico’s research showed that 
the invention requirement “may have developed in a somewhat 
 
 173. See Federico, supra note 27, at 88–89; Rich, supra note 36, at 65–66. 
 174. See Rich, supra note 120, at 105. 
 175. See Charles J. Zinn, Commentary on New Title 35, U.S. Code ‘Patents’, 
1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2507, 2508. 
 176. See Federico, supra note 27, at 89; see also Rich, supra note 17, at 126. 
 177. See Rich, supra note 20, at 1:211. 
 178. See Harris, supra note 13, at 661–62. 
 179. See, e.g., P.J. Federico, Origin and Early History of Patents, 11 J. PAT. 
OFF. SOC’Y 292 (1929) (“This is the first of a series of several papers on the history 
of our patent system. The present paper discusses the origin of patents and the early 
history of patents in England. A second paper will treat of the patents granted in the 
American colonies and a third of the patents granted by the individual states. 
Subsequent papers will trace the development of our present patent system and 
institution.”). 
 180. See generally P.J. Federico, The Concept of Patentable Invention, 32 J. 
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 118 (1950). 
 181. See generally id. 
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different manner.”182 He suggested that “the words ‘invented or 
discovered’ used in the opening phrase of the statute merely refer to 
the question of authorship or originality, meaning that the person must 
be the author of the invention, and not have copied it from some other 
source.”183 Instead, he suggested, the invention requirement referred to 
the “degree or character or quantity of newness” and “may be a 
derivation of the statutory requirement for novelty [as] shown by the 
frequent use of the expression ‘patentable novelty’ or ‘patentable 
difference over the prior art.’”184 In this regard, Federico “attempt[ed] 
to discover when and how the concept of invention as we use it today 
developed.”185 Studying “Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, [which was] 
usually cited as the first case to make the requirement,” he discovered 
that the opinion “places the matter on the basis of novelty, the new 
machine cannot be distinguished from the old one, hence is the same, 
is not novel.”186 Likewise he found “[a] few published decisions before 
1850 show[ing] that patents were refused or held invalid using such 
phrases as ‘in all essentials anticipated,’ ‘nothing essentially new,’ 
‘substantially alike,’ ‘not materially different,’ and sometimes simply 
‘not patentable.’”187 He concluded that “there is one thing we cannot 
escape and that is the fundamental axiom that something new and 
different cannot be patented merely because it is new and different, 
and without regard to the quantum of novelty.”188 This was the purpose 
of the invention requirement. 
 
 182. Id. at 119. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 120. This work clearly formed the basis for Federico’s later 
Commentary. See Federico, supra note 14, at 182 (“The use of the word ‘invented’ in 
this phrase has been asserted as the source of the third requirement under discussion. 
However, a different origin, with which the language and arrangement in the new code 
are in harmony, has also been stated. This is that the requirement originally was an 
extension of the statutory requirement for novelty.”). 
 185. Federico, supra note 180, at 121. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. Again, this idea is reflected in Federico’s later Commentary. See 
Federico, supra note 14, at 181 (“The newness, that is the difference over what was 
previously known, must be sufficient in character, or in quantity, or in quality, in order 
that the new thing may be patented. This requirement has commonly been referred to 
as the requirement for the presence of invention; when the requirement is not present 
it is stated that the subject matter involved lacks invention . . . . The inventor may 
indeed have made an invention in the psychological sense, but it would nevertheless 
not be patentable if the quantum of novelty over the prior art material of which he 
may have been in total ignorance was not sufficient. This requirement for invention 
with which we are here concerned is more of a legal concept than a psychological 
one.”). 
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Federico also may fairly be said to have engaged in scholarly 
activity when he drafted the Patent Act of 1952. This work involved 
two steps. First, for the codification effort, he collected and studied 
“all the Acts of Congress dealing with patents, from the Revised 
Statutes of 1874 to the date of preparation,” and then “reorganiz[ed 
these materials] into a comprehensive restatement of the patent 
statutes.”189 Second, for the reform effort, he collected and studied  
(1) all the bills relating to patents which had been introduced in Congress 
during the preceding twenty-five years, (2) the reports of various official 
investigating committees such as the Science Advisory Board (1935), the 
Temporary National Economic Committee (1941) and the National Patent 
Planning Commission (1943, 1944, 1945), (3) reports and 
recommendations of private groups such as bar associations, and (4) 
miscellaneous sources such as books and articles in periodicals.190 
3. Early Reform Proposals 
Early in reform efforts, before the formation of the Drafting 
Committee or even the request by the subcommittee counsel for 
Federico to put together a draft bill, various groups came forward with 
draft legislation to clarify the invention requirement and overturn 
Cuno (as well as to overturn the Mercoid cases). At that point it was 
important simply to call for change. An early bill, for example, called 
for a statutory test for invention focusing on whether what was 
claimed to be an invention filled a long-felt want.191 Another bill 
sought to overturn Cuno by inserting into the statute a statement that 
the patentability of claimed inventions would be determined 
 
 189. Federico, supra note 14, at 167. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Rich, supra note 17, at 129 (“The first one adopted one of the so-called 
tests for ‘invention.’ The question of ‘invention’ . . . was left to the courts to decide 
that if it filled a long felt want, then it amounted to invention provided that the skill 
of the art to which the invention pertained did not supply such want. Well, the New 
York Patent Law Association had taken a firm stand against that on the ground that if 
you put just one of the dozen or so tests you could find in ‘Walker on Patents’ into the 
statute, that would imply that the others didn’t apply anymore.”); Rich, supra note 20, 
at 1:208–09 (“One of the bills (Gamble, H.R. 4061, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.) was entitled 
‘A BILL To establish a criterion of invention . . .’ and the gist of it was to amend the 
statute (R.S. 4886) by adding rather involved provisions saying, in effect, that the 
claimed subject matter amounts to ‘invention’ if there is a showing of long-felt want 
not supplied by the skill of the art and that the state of the art was unable to fill the 
want. We in New York did not like that bill at all. We feared that to enact as statutory 
law only one of the pro-invention tests would be worse than nothing. Beside which, 
we felt the proposal was unduly restrictive in saying the art had been unable to fill the 
want.”). 
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objectively by the nature of the contribution to the advancement of the 
arts and not subjectively by the nature of the mental process by which 
the invention had been made.192 While neither proposal gained 
support, the die had been cast.193 
4. Organization and Consolidation 
One of the most significant factors leading to the success of the 
patent bar’s involvement was its organization and consolidation. 
Credit for this task goes to Ashton, who after publication of Federico’s 
preliminary draft called the meeting of the National Council, created 
the Coordinating Committee that included bar leaders from across the 
United States, and formed the Drafting Committee composed of Rich 
and Rose.194 The Coordinating Committee, which “contained some of 
the best patent brains in the United States,”195 proved instrumental in 
the process. Harris, the subcommittee counsel, later remarked that 
“[p]robably no other title incorporates the thinking of so many 
qualified technical men throughout the country as does this revision. 
 
 192. See Rich, supra note 17, at 129 (“The second invention bill . . . said, 
‘Patentability of inventions and discoveries including discoveries due to research and 
improvements thereof shall be determined objectively by the nature of the 
contribution to the advancement of the arts and not subjectively by the nature of the 
mental process by which the invention have been made.’ That seemed to have a little 
thought in it that was worth pursuing and . . . the New York Association . . . took the 
idea and made a counter proposal which later on became the last sentence of the first 
paragraph of present section 103.”); Rich, supra note 20, at 1:209 (“The other bill 
(Hartley, H.R. 5248, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.) was entitled ‘A BILL to declare the 
national policy regarding the test for determining invention’ and would have added to 
the statute, R.S. 4886, a sentence reading: ‘Patentability of inventions and discoveries, 
including discoveries due to research, and improvements thereof, shall be determined 
objectively by the nature of the contribution to the advancement of the art, and not 
subjectively by the nature of the mental process by which the invention or discovery, 
or the improvement thereof, may have been accomplished.’ You will sense that this 
was the National Patent Planning Commission’s proposal with trimmings in the form 
of an injection referring to inventions resulting from research, rather than flashes of 
genius, and specific reference to improvement inventions.”). 
 193. Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of “Invention” as Replaced by Sec. 
103 of the 1952 Patent Act, 46 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 855, 864 (1964) (“The outcome of 
those bill to determine invention, and one or two other bills, was that Congress got 
interested in revising and codifying the patent law and did so.”). For a complete 
review of the various proposals and bills and their revisions leading to the Patent Act 
of 1952, see generally Federico, supra note 27. 
 194. See Federico, supra note 27, at 93 (“After the publication of the 
Preliminary Draft, the National Council of Patent Law Associations formed a 
Coordinating Committee to consider the Draft and coordinate recommendations.”). 
 195. Rich, supra note 17, at 126. 
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And a large share of that cooperation was the result of the efforts of 
the Coordinating Committee.”196  
The Coordinating Committee “gave intensive consideration” to 
the pending legislation and “was extremely helpful to the House 
Committee in coordinating the comments from the Patent Bar and 
offering valuable suggestions of their own.”197 Later, after voting to 
support the 1951 bill, it formed an Advisory Committee “of about ten 
members to act at the forthcoming hearings.”198 Rich later explained 
that “[t]he Coordinating Committee chairman and representatives 
spoke with a united front on behalf of the patent bar, organized as 
never before or since.”199 
In this way, the Coordinating Committee indeed allowed the 
patent bar to speak with one voice, uniting the political capital of the 
patent bar behind particular proposals and preventing the appearance 
of dissention. As described by Philip Swain, “it was critical that the 
patent bar was kept under control by the Coordinating Committee, so 
that no single association . . . could directly assert its influence over 
the development of the bill.”200 “Instead, the various associations all 
spoke through the Coordinating Committee at the hearings.”201 This 
proved particularly important because some in the patent community 
and even on the Coordinating Committee disapproved of addressing 
the invention requirement in the pending legislation.202 Rich went so 
far as to describe the ability of the Coordinating Committee to keep 
the patent bar “under control” and speak with one voice as “[t]he secret 
of this whole project which made it a success.”203 
 
 196. Harris, supra note 13, at 661. 
 197. See Zinn, supra note 175, at 2508. 
 198. Rich, supra note 36, at 71.  
 199. Id. at 72. 
 200. Swain, supra note 140, at 18–19. 
 201. Id.; see also Federico, supra note 14, at 168 (“Hearings were held on H.R. 
3760 in June, 1951 . . . . Representatives of Government departments, representatives 
of bar and other associations, and private individuals appeared at the hearing and 
presented their views of the changes in the law proposed by the bill. As a result of the 
hearings and further material received by the Subcommittee, the bill was again revised 
and reintroduced as H.R. 7794, on May 12, 1952.”). 
 202. Rich, supra note 88, at 32 (“In December, 1950, the bar was far from 
unanimous in thinking that the statute should deal with the requirement for 
‘invention,’ not even the members of the Committee agreed. There are always those 
who prefer the status quo, with which they have learned to live, no matter how 
ridiculous it may be.”). 
 203. Rich, supra note 17, at 131. 
 Patent Reform, Then and Now 463 
C. Good Drafting 
As another factor leading to the success of their endeavor, 
Federico and the Drafting Committee engaged in good drafting, which 
involved hard work, good judgment, clarity, flexibility and 
willingness to improve, and, in the end, adoption of a prior judicial 
construct incorporating an objective standard.  
1. Hard Work 
First, Federico and the Drafting Committee did the necessary 
and time-consuming hard work.204 Federico put in significant time and 
effort creating the first draft of the legislation. As discussed above, his 
work progressed in two laborious steps involving the collection and 
analysis of a large volume of material, including prior statutes, 
proposed amendments, reports, recommendations, books, and 
articles.205 In this manner for six months he labored to produce his 
proposed codification and revision, combining the first step of 
codification with the second step of reform in one proposed statute.206 
Then, over a series of additional months, the Drafting Committee 
studied Federico’s draft, compiled and studied lists of proposed 
changes, solicited and organized comments, met and consolidated 
ideas, and prepared reports of their conclusions.207 In the final two 
years, the Drafting Committee shaped the legislation into its final form 
as it collected comments from the patent bar and testified in 
congressional hearings.208  
 
 204. See Frost, supra note 26, at 356 (noting that “Henry Ashton, Pat Federico, 
Giles Rich and Paul Rose . . . deserve respect and credit . . . for those endless hours 
that went into the effort”). 
 205. Federico, supra note 14, at 167. 
 206. Rich, supra note 36, at 66 (“[D]uring the next six months he proceeded 
to produce a proposed codification and revision, combining amending with codifying 
and at the same time including for consideration by the committee some more radical 
proposals, such as maintenance fees, patents of addition, etc.”). 
 207. See Rich, supra note 17, at 131; Rich, supra note 36, at 68–69 (“After 
digesting the materials received and exercising our own judgments thereon, we 
compiled lists of proposed changes on which we had the benefit of Mr. Federico’s 
comments. We also had a virtual third member of the Drafting Committee in Mr. 
Ashton. After two months of this revision work, Messrs. Ashton, Rich, and Rose met 
in Washington to consolidate their ideas, with the assistance of Mr. Federico.”). 
 208. See generally Rich, supra note 17, at 131 (describing the work of the 
Drafting Committee from 1950–1952). 
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2. Good Judgment 
During this process the drafters also made thoughtful choices, 
exercising good judgment.209 For example, as Federico later explained, 
with respect to the old invention requirement, “the first intention was 
to state explicitly and separately the requirement in its own right and 
not as derivative from other expressions by strained meanings and 
fictions.”210 Rich similarly explained that “[t]he first policy decision 
underlying § 103 was to cut loose altogether from the century-old term 
‘invention.’”211 He went on to explain that “[i]t really was a term 
impossible to define, so [they] knew that any effort to define it would 
come to naught.”212 “Moreover, it was felt that so long as the term 
continued in use, the courts would annex to it the accretion of past 
interpretations, a feeling history has shown to be well founded.”213 
3. Clarity 
In addition to hard work and good judgment, Federico and the 
Drafting Committee chose the concepts and the words describing them 
carefully, always seeking clarity. Thus, beyond avoiding the term 
“invention”214 for the first sentence of what became § 103 they 
borrowed the term “obviousness” from proposals made by two 
 
 209. Frost, supra note 26, at 356 (“The 1952 Patent Code was brought into 
being only by the sustained effort of Judge Rich and others of the New York Patent 
Law Association over a period of some five years, and the support of others after 
about 1950 . . . . But success required something more—good judgment.”). 
 210. P.J. Federico, Further Comments and Observations on the Origin of 
Section 103, in NON-OBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY, 
1:303 (John F. Witherspoon, ed., 1978). 
 211. Rich, supra note 88, at 26, 33–34.  
 212. Id. at 34. 
 213. Id. 
 214. See Rich, supra note 193, at 864–65 (“The presence or absence of 
‘invention’ is not mentioned. The use of the term was, in fact, carefully avoided with 
a view to making a fresh start, free of all the divergent court opinions . . . about 
‘invention.’”); Rich, supra note 20, at 1:189–91 (“All of the trouble people were 
trying to remedy by these bills attached to the undefinable term ‘invention,’ as the 
name of a third requirement for patentability. ‘Why don’t we get away from this 
troublesome term altogether?’ I asked. ‘Let’s not use it at all and say what we really 
mean, and speak in terms of a requirement for patentability, saying how it shall be 
determined.’”); id. at 1:189 (“The first change the Coordinating Committee made in 
the Federico draft of section 103—and I am sure it was my doing, no objections being 
heard—was to change the title so that it read ‘non-obvious subject matter’ instead of 
‘lack of invention.’”). 
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witnesses in 1949.215 Federico and the Drafting Committee carefully 
considered the words to describe this nonobviousness test.216 The 
phrase “though the invention is not identically disclosed or 
described”217 and the terms “identically,”218 “ordinary,”219 and “prior 
art”220 all received careful attention. Conceptually, moreover, the time, 
characteristics of the fictitious hypothetical person, and what must 
have been obvious were all carefully conceived and identified.221  
4. Flexibility and Willingness to Improve 
The construction of the second sentence of what became § 103 
likewise demonstrated good drafting in another sense: the fact that the 
drafters were willing to change their proposal significantly to improve 
 
 215. Rich, supra note 20, at 1:190 (“As to the source of the test of obviousness 
which he incorporated, he tells us in his new article [it] ‘. . . was a synthesis of 
numerous equivalent expressions which had been used and the words and phrases 
used had been frequently used and were in the common stock of patent law 
terminology. In fact at the 1949 hearings two witnesses made proposals which 
included the phrase “obvious to one skilled in such art.”’ The two witnesses were, as 
a matter of possible interest, Fritz Lanham of Lanham Act fame, by that time retired 
from Congress and lobbying for National Patent Council, an organization headed by 
Mr. Anderson of Anco windshield-wiper blade fame, an ardent promoter of a sound 
patent system, and a Mr. C.E. Beach, a consulting engineer.”). 
 216. See, e.g., Federico, supra note 210, at 1:303.  
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. (“The word ‘identically’ was inserted . . . to emphasize and sharpen 
the distinction between matters which are in fact anticipated and those which are 
not.”). 
 219. Id. at 1:304 (“The original wording referred to the ‘ordinary’ person skill 
in the art[,] . . . but the ordinary got shifted to a better place later on.”); Rich, supra 
note 20, at 1:191 (“The first paragraph was changed in substance only by placing the 
word ‘ordinary’ in its proper place and adding ‘at the time the invention was made.’”). 
 220. Rich, supra note 20, at 1:191 (“One last change, made by the 
Coordinating Committee at the suggestion of the Bar Association of the City of New 
York Patent Committee is worth noting. The versions of section 103 in the two bills 
preceding the final one referred back either to ‘the material specified in section 102’ 
or ‘the prior art set forth in section 102.’ It was proposed to change this reference to 
refer simply to ‘the prior art’ so as to include all prior art, not merely the anticipatory 
art named in section 102. That change was made.”). 
 221. Id. at 1:189–90 (“Federico’s first paragraph of draft section 23 . . . 
contains all of the elements of the first sentence of the present section 103 with the 
exception of restriction to the time the invention was made.”); Rich, supra note 88, at 
34 (“The unobviousness is as of a particular time and to a particular legally fictitious, 
technical person, analogous to the “ordinary reasonable man” so well known to courts 
as a legal concept . . . . But that is not all; what must have been obvious is “the subject 
matter as a whole.”). 
466 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
it.222 Rich presented a counterproposal at one point suggesting that, to 
overrule Cuno, the sentence state that “patentability shall be 
determined by the nature of the contribution to the advancement of the 
art not by the nature of the process by which such contribution may 
have been accomplished.”223 Federico adopted it with some 
modifications.224 This counterproposal’s focus on “contribution to the 
advancement of the art,” however, later seemed to support “the 
statement in the concurring opinion of the Great A & P case in regard 
to pushing ‘back the frontiers of chemistry, physics and the like; to 
make a distinctive contribution to scientific knowledge.’”225 Thus, “it 
was not surprising to find growing support for transforming the 
phraseology (especially the elimination of the term ‘contribution’) of 
this second paragraph into the short, but pithy second sentence 
reading, ‘Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which 
the invention was made.’”226 This change eliminated the danger that 
the prior language might be deemed a positive requirement of how 
patentability shall be determined and therefore restrict patentability, 
when the only goal was to eliminate the “flash of creative genius” test 
derived from Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket 
Equipment Corp.227 
More generally and beyond changes impacting the substance of 
the legislation, the drafters proved to be flexible, incorporating 
changes that eliminated controversy, provided clarity, and dropped 
unnecessary language. The drafters, for example, made every effort 
“to compromise differences so as to remove as much controversy as 
possible about the bill and at the same time to preserve the 
 
 222. See Rich, supra note 20, at 1:189. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. (“Federico also tells us that his second paragraph was based on the 
N.Y.P.L.A.’s counterproposal o [sic] the Hartley bill and, indeed, he took that 
language with only one substantial change. He inserted the word ‘mental’ to modify 
the expression ‘process by which such contribution may have been accomplished.[’] 
(It was later removed.) He also pluralized ‘process.’ But notably he did not talk about 
‘invention’ or any requirement therefore.”). 
 225. Harris, supra note 13, at 677 n.28.  
 226. Id. 
 227. Rich, supra note 20, at 1:191 (“The second paragraph, which became the 
second sentence of the present law, was considerably simplified. Its real purpose being 
to knock out ‘flash of genius’ holdings, there was no need for a positive statement 
saying how patentability shall be determined, a statement also felt to be dangerous as 
possibly restrictive, and it was reduced to a simple statement of how it shall not be 
negatived.”). 
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substance.”228 In the end, Federico and the Drafting Committee also 
spent significant time polishing and refining their language.229 Later 
reflecting upon this effort, Rich remarked that “[t]he words of the 
statute are the tools of the law and should be kept clean and bright and 
sharp,”230 and that “[t]he ultimate reason for writing section 103 into 
the statutory law was that the requirement for invention was a lead 
razor which could not take an edge and could be nothing other than a 
blunt instrument. Section 103 was enacted as a much better tool for 
the job.”231 Zinn and the Judiciary Committee contributed to the effort 
to seek clarity, as well as conciseness.232 At the conclusion of those 
efforts, Zinn gave the resulting legislation high praise, stating his 
belief that “[t]he statutory patent law is one of the most concise and 
brief of all branches of federal legislation.”233 
5. Adoption of Prior Judicial Standard 
The drafters chose to adopt prior judicial standards rather than 
create new standards out of whole cloth. The obviousness rationale for 
denying patentability traces its origin at least to Thomas Jefferson in 
 
 228. Rich, supra note 36, at 74; see also Harris, supra note 13, at 660 (“[W]ith 
the help of the experts [the revisers] executed the delicate cutting and changing, 
always carefully maintaining the sound basic principles of our patent system.”); 
Federico, supra note 14, at 168 (“The preliminary draft was widely distributed and 
many reports were received by the Subcommittee. As a result of the comments 
received from the patent bar, the public and other interested groups, it was decided to 
omit many of the proposed changes as being obviously too controversial for inclusion 
in one bill. Taking into consideration the suggestions and criticisms and other 
comments which had been received, a bill was prepared and introduced in the 81st 
Congress, H.R. 9133, dated July 17, 1950. This bill was widely distributed (over six 
thousand copies were sent out) and again comments were solicited and received. As 
[a] result, the bill was revised and reintroduced in the 82nd Congress as H.R. 3760, 
April 18, 1951.”). 
 229. Rich, supra note 20, at 1:190 (“The final chapter of the writing of Section 
103 was simply its polishing up and the refinement of language . . . .”). 
 230. Id. at 1:192. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Giles S. Rich, Selected Speeches of Giles S. Rich: The New York Patent 
Law Association, 3 J. FED. CIR. HIST. SOC’Y 103, 105 (2009) (“The language has been 
cleared up. And according to modern practice, if a thing can be said in one word, it is 
not said in four or five. Charles Zinn, the codification counsel of the House Judiciary 
Committee contributed greatly to this simplicity . . . .”); Harris, supra note 13, at 675 
(“The Judiciary Committee attempted to express the subjective concept clearly and 
simply in as objective terms as possible.”). 
 233. Zinn, supra note 175, at 2509. 
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1791.234 In 1850, however, the Supreme Court “firmly grafted [the 
concept] onto the statute in the form of case law . . . in Hotchkiss v. 
Greenwood.”235 As explained by Rich, “[t]he gist of Hotchkiss v. 
Greenwood is that the Supreme Court, like Jefferson, sensed that 
Congress had not included in the statute a necessary limitation on the 
grant of patents and added that condition itself.”236 In adopting the 
nonobviousness test from Hotchkiss, the drafters selected one of many 
articulations of the standard of invention identified in the Supreme 
Court’s cases. This approach no doubt reduced the controversy 
associated with their proposal.237 Likewise, even the second sentence 
of what became § 103—or at least the idea behind it—found 
precedence in a decision of Justice Story in 1825.238 In Earle v. Sawyer, 
he explained that  
[i]t is of no consequence whether the thing [claimed] be simple or 
complicated; whether it be by accident, or by long, laborious thought, or by 
an instantaneous flash of mind, that it is first done. The law looks to the fact, 
and not the process by which it is accomplished.239  
This too likely reduced the sting of overturning Cuno given that it 
directly contradicted any requirement of a “flash of creative genius.” 
 
 234. Rich, supra note 88, at 28 (“By 1791 [Thomas Jefferson] had discovered 
that something was missing from the law; too many people were trying to patent 
trifles. So he proposed an amendment adding as a defense to a patent that ‘The 
invention is so unimportant and obvious that it ought not to be the subject of an 
exclusive right.’”). 
 235. Id. at 29. 
 236. Id. 
 237. By not expressly excluding other articulations of the standard of 
invention (other than the “flash of genius”), however, the drafters eventually 
encountered resistance to the exclusion of these other articulations. See id. at 36 
(“When, as was the case with the ‘requirement for invention,’ the century’s 
accumulation of judicial precedents range from A to Z in strictness and Congress, 
looking at the situation under the guiding light of Kettering’s statement that this is no 
yardstick and the greatest technical weakness of the patent system, determines to 
make a yardstick and says the measure shall be ‘M,’ right in the middle of the range, 
it behooves everyone concerned with administering that law to follow the measure 
‘M’ and to stop flitting about arbitrarily from A to Z, ignoring what Congress has 
done.”). 
 238. Federico, supra note 210, at 1:304 (“I should add a word about the second 
sentence of Section 103 . . . . I will only add that the thought was not new in patent 
law. As long ago as 1825 Justice Story said: ‘It is of no consequence whether the thing 
be simple or complicated, whether it be by accident or by long, laborious thought or 
by an instantaneous flash of the mind, that it was done. The law looks to the fact, and 
not the process by which it was first done.’”). 
 239. Earle v. Sawyer, Fed. Case No. 4247; 4 Mason 1; 1 Robb Pat. Case 490 
at 256 (D. Mass.) (Story, J.). 
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6. Adoption of an Objective Standard 
Beyond adopting prior judicial standards, the drafters attempted 
to select a standard that did not permit purely subjective decision-
making but instead channeled the analysis into questions with 
objectively verifiable answers.240 The invention requirement 
notoriously allowed for subjective decision-making.241 According to 
Rich, “[e]veryone realized it was subjective.”242 Indeed, “[t]he essence 
of being a patent lawyer or examiner—or a judge in a patent case—
was to know an invention when you saw one.”243 This subjectivity, 
moreover, 
left every judge practically scott-free [sic] to decide this often controlling 
factor according to his personal philosophy of what inventions should be 
patented, whether or not he had any knowledge of the patent system as an 
operative socioeconomic force. This was too great a freedom because it 
involves national policy which should be declared by Congress, not by 
individual judges . . . .244 
As Rich also described, “[t]he requirement for ‘invention’ was 
the plaything of the judges who, as they became initiated into its 
mysteries, delighted to devise and expound their own ideas of what it 
meant, some very lovely prose resulting.”245 Indeed, “we went through 
periods of too much leniency and too much strictness, depending 
primarily, just as now, on what judges thought and the mood of 
country.”246 
In the face of the subjective question of invention and these 
problems it created, the drafters (with the help of the House Judiciary 
 
 240. See Rich, supra note 88, at 31. 
 241. See id. 
 242. Id. (“What it all came down to, in final analysis, in the Patent Office or 
in court, was that if the Office or a judge was persuaded that an invention was 
patentable (after hearing all the praise by the owner and all the denigration by the 
opposition) then it was an ‘invention.’ How that decision was reached was rarely 
revealed. Everyone realized it was subjective.”). 
 243. Id. at 30 (“The requirement for ‘invention’ was at one and the same time 
a hard reality and a great mystery. Really, it was an absurdity . . . . You knew it by 
intuition, presumably from experience which, of course, judges passing on its 
presence or absence did not always have. The essence of being a patent lawyer or 
examiner—or a judge in a patent case—was to know an invention when you saw one 
yet there was no formal ordination. It was as easy as becoming a bird watcher. Judges, 
ex officio, were instant experts on the question.”). 
 244. Rich, supra note 193, at 865. 
 245. Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 
404 (1960). 
 246. Rich, supra note 88, at 31. 
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Committee) “attempted to express the subjective concept clearly and 
simply in as objective terms as possible.”247 The nonobviousness 
inquiry does just that; it requires the objectively verifiable 
identification of the prior art, differences between the prior art and the 
claimed invention, and level of ordinary skill in the technical field.248 
“While the ultimate decision as to . . . what would be obvious to him 
is subjective, it is one definite proposition on which evidence can be 
adduced.”249  
D. Legislative Stewardship 
Another factor contributing to the success of reform efforts was 
legislative stewardship, and by that I primarily mean avoiding political 
intervention by opponents of the legislation and engaging in political 
intervention to win support for the legislation. As a preliminary matter, 
however, the avoidance of the appearance of politics no doubt 
contributed to the success of the reform efforts. Philip Swain, for 
example, has stated that “it was crucial that Congress initiated the bill 
itself: this lent the bill a great deal of credibility, and generally 
underscored the importance of the project.”250 Yet, as shown below, 
the lack of any appearance of politics should not be mistaken for the 
absence of politics. In the words of George Frost, “[l]egislation is 
politics. Politics is the art of the possible. The remarkable thing is that 
 
 247. Harris, supra note 13, at 675. 
 248. Rich, supra note 245, at 406 (“The question will, of course, be asked, 
‘What difference does it make, it must still be a subjective decision?’ True, but now 
the statute provides a standard according to which the subjective decision must be 
made. There is a vast difference between basing a decision on exercise of the inventive 
or creative faculty, or genius, ingenuity, patentable novelty, flashes, surprises and 
excitement, on the one hand, and basing it on unobviousness to one of ordinary skill 
in the art on the other. It is possible to determine what art is involved, what type of 
skill is possessed by ordinary workers in it, and come to some conclusion as to what 
‘ordinary skill’ would be at a given time. This may present knotty problems but it is 
a definite pattern of thinking and does not leave the Patent Office or the courts free to 
conclude that a thing is not patentable for any old reason and then stand on the 
proposition that something indefinable and impalpable called ‘invention’ was not 
involved. At least they have to talk in terms of obviousness to a man of ordinary skill 
in the art.”). 
 249. Id. 
 250. Swain, supra note 140, at 18. 
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the [Patent Act of 1952], with the significant legislative changes 
contained, was passed at all.”251 
1. Avoiding Political Intervention 
On the one hand, legislative stewardship involved avoiding 
political intervention by opponents of the legislation. A motivating 
factor in Federico drafting the legislation—and thus one of the keys to 
the success of the entire enterprise—was fear that the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice would draft it.252 Rich later 
reported that Federico told Commissioner Kingsland, “[i]f we don’t 
get aboard this thing the Department of Justice Antitrust Division is 
going to do it and that would be a disaster.”253 It would have been a 
disaster because, in those days, the Department of Justice “was taking 
exactly the opposite position from the majority of the Bar, saying 
patents are monopolies and you can’t use patents to monopolize things 
that the patents don’t cover.”254 Thus, “Federico . . . accepted the task 
of codification . . . in part because he feared that if the Patent Office 
did not adopt the project, then the Department of Justice Antitrust 
Division would attempt to draft the codification[, which] would 
almost certainly have spelled the demise of contributory 
infringement.”255 Indeed, with respect to the attempt to overturn the 
Mercoid cases and other issues, the main opponent was the 
Department of Justice and, in particular, its Antitrust Division.256 
Nevertheless, the House committee relied upon the testimony of Rich 
 
 251. Frost, supra note 26, at 356; see also id. (“Plainly the authors of the Code 
had to be selective. They managed to make important changes, probably the most that 
could have been made at the time.”). 
 252. See Rich, supra note 17, at 126 (“[T]he Congressional Committee called 
up people who were there and said ‘Listen, we’ve got all these bills about patents so 
why don’t we take up Title 35 as our next codification project?’ . . . . Federico . . . 
went back to the Commissioner and told him about this, and said, ‘Look, if the Patent 
Office doesn’t do this job, the Antitrust Division is going to do it. And we had better 
do it.’”); Rich, supra note 122, at 7 (“I have to rate P.J. Federico’s work on the Patent 
Act of 1952 as one of his greatest contributions, not only in his drafting of legislation 
but in his seizing the opportunity, when it was proposed in Congress, to keep the 
project in the hands of experienced patent lawyers.”). 
 253. Rich, supra note 17, at 130. 
 254. Id. at 128. 
 255. Swain, supra note 140, at 18. 
 256. See Harris, supra note 13, at 681 (noting the Department of Justice’s 
objection to the presumption of validity); id. at 693 (noting the Antitrust Department’s 
objection to the contributory infringement provision). 
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to reject the Antitrust Division’s objection to the contributory 
infringement provisions in Federico’s proposal.257 
In addition to taking control of the drafting of the legislation—
which also allowed for the close interaction of Ashton, Federico, Rose, 
and Rich with the House subcommittee counsel—the reformers also 
took advantage of a parliamentary strategy to avoid controversy and 
debate: they placed the bill on the consent calendar of the House and 
Senate.258 As explained by Philip Swain, 
the fact that the bill was successfully placed on a consent calendar cut 
through much of the red tape that typically slows the progress of any given 
bill. Items on a consent calendar do not take a vote of the whole Congress, 
and there are no floor debates. Rather, those bills placed on a consent 
calendar pass automatically so long as none of the congressmen designated 
as “watchers” finds anything wrong with the bill. The fact that this bill was 
primarily a codification of existing law made the bill less conspicuous, and 
allowed it to pass in this way.259 
While placing the bill on the consent calendar made it less 
conspicuous, “to get it enacted promptly without a long debate it had 
to be kept noncontroversial.”260  
2. Engaging in Political Intervention 
On the other hand, legislative stewardship also involved 
engaging in political intervention when necessary and appropriate. 
Two examples of political intervention will paint the proper picture. 
 
 257. Id. at 694 (“The committee, however, after much deliberation and after 
convincing itself that the enforcement of certain patents without resort to the doctrine 
of contributory infringement was practically impossible, included it in the statute.”). 
 258. See Smith, supra note 157, at 912 (“You got it on a Consent Calendar at 
the appropriate moment, and that meant no floor debate. It was because of this little 
technique that you got a new patent statute when you did.”). Rich later explained: 
“The consent calendar works this way—they have a half dozen watchers from each 
side of the aisle and when the bill comes up, if no watcher finds anything wrong with 
it, it gets passed automatically. There was no floor debate. It was never on the floor.” 
See Rich, supra note 17, at 132. For Congressman Crumpacker’s description of the 
use of the consent calendar, see S.J. Crumpacker, The Patent Act of 1952—A 
Congressional Perspective, in SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS, PATENT SYMPOSIUM, 
SECTION OF PATENTS, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW 140, 143–144 (American 
Bar Center, Chicago, 1962). 
 259. Swain, supra note 140, at 19. 
 260. Rich, supra note 88, at 35; Rich, supra note 17, at 132 (“You think that 
Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1952. Congress as a whole didn’t know a thing 
about the Patent Act of 1952. Most of them had never heard of it. Why? Because it 
was put on a consent calendar. It was a codification of the law. It wasn’t controversial. 
You didn’t take a vote of the whole Congress.”). 
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The first example relates to the political work necessary to start 
the legislative process. As George Frost explained, “[g]aining 
Congressional attention, getting the bills introduced, and motivating 
the hearings was no small accomplishment” given that “[m]any 
federal judges, officials in the Administration, members of Congress, 
and academics had no use for the patent system.”261 Rich once told a 
story about how the reformists were able to have one of their bills 
introduced into Congress. A member of their group, Charlie Walker, 
had a friend named Cliff Case who was a member of the House of 
Representatives from New Jersey.262 Walker and Rich took Case to 
lunch to explain the bill to him, after which he indicated “it looked 
good to him and he would be glad to introduce” it.263 Case, however, 
explained that bills were introduced “all the time but that doesn’t get 
you anywhere.”264 He proposed to “arrange a little function down in 
Washington and invite the members of the committees on patents to 
come to dinner” so that Walker and Rich could “explain [the] bill to 
them.”265 Rich explained what happened at the meeting: 
So he set up the party at the Metropolitan Club and the Senate Committee 
on Patents Chairman was there and several members of the House 
Committee were there and we all came and we all had a few drinks and sat 
down to a good dinner. . . . Walker and [Robert] Byerly and I told about our 
bill. They put the bill down for a House hearing in about three weeks.266 
The need to have this dinner and its success caused Rich later to 
remark that this “was [his] first legislative experience and lesson about 
how you really get things done . . . in Washington.”267 
The second example relates to the political work necessary to 
end the legislative process by securing a final vote passing the relevant 
bill. Federico told the tale in bland terms, explaining that on July 3, 
1952, a Senator objected to the final bill, removing it from the consent 
calendar and placing it as the bottom of the list of all pending bills, but 
on the next day, July 4, it “passed by unanimous consent, the Senator 
 
 261. Frost, supra note 26, at 345. As Frost explained, “[o]nly a small corps of 
relatively conservative individuals on Capitol Hill had the least interest in curtailing 
the onslaught.” Id. 
 262. See Rich, supra note 17, at 128. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 128–29. Walker, Byerly, and Rich drafted the bill seeking to 
overturn the Mercoid cases. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 4 of the Committee 
on the Judiciary, on H.R. 3866, 81st Cong. 2 (1950). 
 267. Rich, supra note 17, at 128–29. 
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who had had it reconsidered not raising any objection.”268 Rich and 
Representative Shepherd J. Crumpacker of Indiana told the far more 
interesting, complete story.  
Senator William Langer from North Dakota objected to the bill 
on behalf of a constituent “with a small dress shop or something like 
that who was trying to get a trademark registered and was having 
trouble with it.”269 In response, Federico contacted Senator Langer to 
explain that the constituent simply needed a good trademark lawyer; 
Senator Langer “took the lady and [Federico] to dinner [where 
Federico] . . . no doubt explained all the niceties of the trademark law 
. . . but more important at the moment . . . was able to explain the 
purposes of the Patent Act to the Senator”;270 Representative 
Crumpacker identified and called another constituent of Senator 
Langer in Wisconsin “from a pay station in the Capitol and while in a 
telephone booth undertook to explain the entire Patent Act to him”;271 
Ashton called clients in North Dakota and told them, “[f]or God’s sake 
get a hold of your Senator and tell him this is a good bill. It really 
ought to be passed”;272 Representative Crumpacker “pressed into 
service Francis Thomas . . . a most resourceful gentleman,” in the hope 
of getting the bill taken up the next day;273 and Senator Wiley did put 
the bill back on the consent calendar the following day.274 “[T]his time 
Senator Langer, having been fixed up, kept quiet and the bill 
passed.”275 
E. Article and Speaking Campaign 
Another significant factor contributing to the success 
eliminating the invention requirement was the campaign, primarily by 
Federico and Rich, but to a lesser extent by others substantively 
involved with the drafting of the Patent Act of 1952, to write and speak 
about what exactly the legislation did and why. In his 
 
 268. Federico, supra note 14, at 169. 
 269. Rich, supra note 17, at 132. 
 270. Crumpacker, supra note 258, at 148. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Rich, supra note 17, at 132. 
 273. Crumpacker, supra note 258, at 148. 
 274. See Rich, supra note 17, at 132. 
 275. Id.; Rich, supra note 122, at 8 (“[W]hen one nameless Senator (out of 
deference to Pat’s dislike for embarrassing anyone in print, I omit his name) almost 
killed the Bill on July 3, . . . it was Pat who pacified him by solving a trademark 
problem which was bothering one of the Senator’s constituents so that he kept quiet 
on July 4 and let the bill go through. Pat called on him the next day to thank him.”). 
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characteristically understated way, Federico, writing in the third 
person although he was discussing his own activities, later explained 
that, “[a]fter the law was enacted, several of the persons involved gave 
talks or wrote articles explanatory of the new Title 35, Patents, of the 
U.S. Code.”276  
1. Federico, Zinn, and Harris 
Indeed, Federico wrote his influential Commentary,277 which 
was originally published in the annotated version of Title 35 by West 
Publishing Company.278 This Commentary, however, represented a 
compilation of numerous speeches Federico gave shortly after passage 
of the 1952 Patent Act. As explained in the Commentary itself, he gave 
“talks [ranging from] several series of three or four lectures covering 
the entire act in detail to single shorter ones for a more general nature 
or dealing with only particular phases of the act.”279 Federico gave 
these talks to the Los Angeles Patent Law Association, the Patent Law 
Association of Chicago, the New York Patent Law Association, the 
Patent Section of the American Bar Association, and the American 
Patent Law Association.280 Besides Federico, subcommittee counsel 
Zinn wrote his own commentary.281 Subcommittee counsel Harris too 
wrote an article.282 Significantly, in these articles and speeches, the 
writers stressed the important changes the Act had made to the law, 
including both replacing the invention requirement with the 
nonobviousness requirement and the elimination of the “flash of 
creative genius” test.283 
 
 276. Federico, supra note 27, at 96. 
 277. See generally Federico, supra note 14. 
 278. Id. at 161 n.*. 
 279. Id. at 162. 
 280. Id. 
 281. See generally Zinn, supra note 175. 
 282. See generally Harris, supra note 13.  
 283. Zinn, supra note 175, at 2512 (“There are several important changes of 
substance made in [Part II of the patent statute] with which the practitioner should 
become familiar.”); id. at 2513 (“The second sentence of this section providing that 
patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made 
eliminates the ‘flash of genius’ concept that has been considered as an essential 
element of patentability since the Cuno case . . . . The patentability of an invention 
resulting from arduous experimentation will not be negatived solely because it does 
not meet that concept.”); Federico, supra note 14, at 180 (“The Committee Report[s] 
state, in the general part, that one of the two ‘major changes or innovations’ in the 
new statute consisted in ‘incorporating a requirement for invention in section 103.’” 
); id. at 212 (“Paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of section 271 are of considerable importance 
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2. Rich 
Rich also spoke and wrote about the importance of the Act.284 
Shortly after passage of the Act, he spoke to the New York Patent Law 
Association, explaining that “[s]ection 103 is one of those matters of 
major importance: The statutory inclusion of a requirement for 
invention . . . . That is not new law, but we have it here where the 
courts can’t crawl away from it.”285 He likewise stressed that “the last 
clause of Section 103 is intended to lay the ghost of the ‘flash of 
genius’ furore . . . . That is, long toil stands on an equal footing with 
flashes [of genius].”286  
Almost all of Rich’s influential speeches and articles, however, 
came after 1956, when he became a judge on the Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals. One of Judge Rich’s first significant speeches 
after he joined the bench, Principles of Patentability, took place in his 
hometown of Rochester, New York, as well as Dayton, Ohio, in 1959, 
and he published it the following year.287 Significantly, in that speech 
he explained that the 1952 Act eliminated the invention requirement 
to “free the law and lawyers from bondage to that old and meaningless 
term.”288 In 1963, he published another article, this one entitled 
 
and the Committee Report characterizes them as one of the major changes or 
innovations in the title.”); Harris, supra note 13, at 674 n.62 (citation omitted) (“The 
Hearings on these bills in the 80th and 81st Congress indicate that they were drawn 
mainly to eliminate the so-called ‘flash of creative genius’ requirement and, as a result 
of a proposal made by The National Patent Planning Commission that a provision be 
enacted as a declaration of policy, they were intended ‘to lay down a reasonably 
understandable test by which inventions shall be judged.’”). 
 284. Swain, supra note 140, at 19 (“In the years following the passing of the 
Patent Act, Rich began a speaking-and-writing campaign aimed toward educating the 
patent lawyers and judges about the changes entailed by the Patent Act.”). 
 285. Rich, supra note 120, at 108. 
 286. Id. Rich, however, spent significantly more time discussing the 
codification of contributory infringement under § 271. Id. at 113–14. 
 287. See Rich, supra note 245, at 393 n.*. 
 288. Id. at 405 (“Nowhere in the entire act is there any reference to a 
requirement of ‘invention’ and the drafters did this deliberately in an effort to free the 
law and lawyers from bondage to that old and meaningless term. The word ‘invention’ 
is used in the statute only to refer to the thing invented. That is why the requirement 
of ‘invention’ should be referred to, if at all, only with respect due to that which is 
dead. . . . [W]hat we have today, and have had since January 1, 1953, is a requirement 
of unobviousness, rather than a requirement of ‘invention.’”); see also id. (“Though 
one may call section 103 ‘codification’ it took a case law doctrine, expressed in 
hundreds of different ways, and put it into statutory language in a single form 
approved by Congress. In such form it became law superior to that which may be 
derived from any prior court opinion.”). For a description of all Judge Rich’s speeches 
 Patent Reform, Then and Now 477 
Congressional Intent—or, Who Wrote the Patent Act of 1952.289 His 
purpose was “to convey an accurate picture of how the 1952 Act came 
to be written; who wrote it; how it was done; and the relative roles of 
the actual authors and the Congress” with the “hope[] . . . that the 
knowledge will be of practical use to patent practitioners in helping to 
keep the patent system on a straight and efficacious course.”290 
Specifically, he sought to rebut the idea that the Act merely codified 
the invention requirement rather than eliminating it.291 Then, the next 
year, in 1964, Judge Rich gave his most important speech, which while 
entitled The Vague Concept of ‘Invention’ as Replaced by Section 103 
of the 1952 Patent Act has come to be known as the Kettering Address. 
Below I discuss the significance of the Kettering Address in the 
context of the Supreme Court’s 1966 decision in Graham v. John 
Deere.292 For now, I merely note that, again, Judge Rich stressed the 
views of the drafters of the Act and, in particular, their intent, which 
was to replace the invention requirement with the nonobviousness 
requirement and to eliminate the “flash of creative genius” test.293 
 
between 1959 and 1964, see John K. Witherspoon, “Turning the Corner”: A Tribute 
to Giles Sutherland Rich, 3 J. FED. CIR. HIST. SOC’Y 157, 158–59 (2009). For example, 
in 1960 and 1961 he gave speeches at the John Marshall Law School, at George 
Washington University Law School, and in Toledo, Ohio. Id. 
 289. See generally Rich, supra note 36. 
 290. Id. at 61–62. 
 291. This purpose is made clear in the conclusion of the article, where Judge 
Rich stated that 
if legislative intent is to be found anywhere in the legislative body, it is in 
the views expressed by committees as found in their hearings and reports. 
That one legislator, who knows nothing of the details and who has only 
one vote, stands to ask one question of another legislator, who also knows 
nothing of the details and who gives a noncommittal answer, is no 
expression of “legislative intent.”  
Id. at 77–78. Judge Rich made this statement to rebut the argument, which had been 
adopted by some courts, that the floor exchange indicated the Patent Act of 1952 
merely codified the invention requirement. See id. at 76 n.21 (emphasis added) 
(describing this exchange and stating that “[a]ny senator or representative who got as 
far as reading the title of the bill would see it was a bill ‘to revise and codify the 
laws’”). 
 292. See infra Subsection I.F.2. 
 293. Rich, supra note 193, at 870 (“From the viewpoint of the writers of the 
law, [Judge Learned Hand’s] Bausch & Lomb opinion was the first to comprehend 
their true intent.”); id. at 869 (“[T]he 1952 Patent Act was intended by their fellow 
legislators to replace the ‘standard of invention’ . . . .”); id. at 867–68 (“Following a 
phrase casually dropped by the Supreme Court in Cuno v. Automatic, in 1941, that 
‘the new device, however useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative genius,’ 
some courts took off on a quest for such a flash and, not finding it, invalidated patents. 
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Around the same time as the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Graham, Judge Rich focused his efforts on ensuring the Patent Act of 
1952 received proper application in the lower courts. To do so, from 
1965 to 1971 he lectured to new judges about patent law at an 
orientation school run by the Federal Judicial Center.294 He also 
provided the new judges with written notes corresponding to his 
lectures, and these notes included several statements highlighting how 
the invention requirement had been replaced by the nonobviousness 
requirement.295 
In the words of Donald Dunner, Judge Rich “labored heavily . . . 
to inject some clarity into a then very muddled patent law—
substituting . . . the concept of obviousness . . . for the quite useless 
‘invention’ standard”—and then “embarked on a crusade to educate 
his colleagues on the bench . . . as well as the members of the bar in 
the proper use and application of the patent law.”296 “Indeed, it was in 
his role as a teacher to bench and bar that he made some of his most 
significant contributions, not only through the opinions he wrote but 
through countless lectures he gave and articles he wrote creating the 
gospel according to St. Giles.”297 
 
The last sentence of section 103 stopped this abruptly with the legislative command: 
‘Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was 
made.’”). 
 294. Frost, supra note 26, at 352 (“The generation of judges that was on the 
federal bench in 1952 was gradually replaced by new judges. The new judges attended 
an orientation school designed to acquaint them with the varied and important duties 
laid upon them. Judge Rich was instrumental in lecturing to the new judges.”); Hatch, 
supra note 164, at 152 (“He in turn shared his knowledge and intellect with students 
. . . as a lecturer on patent and copyright law as part of the Federal Judicial Center’s 
training program for newly appointed judges from the program’s inception in 1965 
until 1971.”). 
 295. Giles S. Rich, Seminars for Newly Appointed United States District 
Judges, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 1970 and 1971, 515–16 (citations omitted) 
(“NOTA BENE: 35 U.S.C. § 103 is a new statutory replacement of a case law rule, 
developed over a century, that to be patentable an invention must involve a mystical 
quality known as ‘invention.’ A century’s worth of opinions on the subject are still 
being cited but they are all obsolete, at least in their terminology. The judicial 
investigation today is to determine section 103 unobviousness, not the presence or 
absence of ‘invention.’ There is always an invention before the court; the issue is its 
patentability.”); id. at 532 (“Pitfalls to Avoid in Opinions Dealing With Patents . . . 
Talking of a standard of ‘invention’—standard is unobviousness.”); id. at 533 (“Avoid 
the expression ‘alleged inventions.’ There is always an invention, whether or not it is 
patentable. This hedging expression is a throwback to the pre-1953, pre-section 103 
era when patentability required the presence of ‘invention’—that mystical 
something.”). 
 296. Dunner, supra note 158, at 71. 
 297. Id. 
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F. Judicial Recognition 
As already mentioned, some of the speeches focused on 
educating judges. That was, of course, because the success of the effort 
to eliminate the invention requirement required judicial recognition. 
At first it did not look promising. Indeed, as Judge Rich later reported 
using a particularly dramatic metaphor naming the Act a bastard child, 
courts did not interpret § 103 consistently with the hopes and dreams 
of its drafters.298 Instead, undeterred, in case after case courts 
continued to apply the invention requirement.299 And then Learned 
Hand decided a case in 1955. 
1. Learned Hand 
As Judge Rich recalled, “[t]he very first judicial recognition of 
what was intended by § 103 was Judge Learned Hand’s opinion for 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb.”300 In 
that opinion, Judge Hand confronted the question of whether the court 
“should construe § 103 as restoring the law to what it was when the 
Court announced the definition of invention, now expressly embodied 
in § 103, or whether we should assume that no change whatever was 
intended.”301 Judge Hand noted that the invention would have been 
 
 298. Rich, supra note 20, at 1:203 (“This child of unknown parentage but 
many ancestors, was rejected, in its early days, by court after court with a passion akin 
to old-fashioned abhorrence of illegitimacy, especially of infants not of their own 
creation, and, with rather poor prospects of survival, was taken in and nourished by a 
kindly CCPA.”). 
 299. George Frost discusses three from 1953. Frost, supra note 26, at 348 
(“Three decisions in 1953 illustrate the underwhelming reception the Code initially 
received.”); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Estate Stove Co., 203 F.2d 912, 915 (6th 
Cir. 1953) (“We fail to see the basis upon which the conclusion can be drawn, as 
argued by appellee, that the Patent Act of 1952 provides a new test of patentability, in 
so far as the issue of patentability in the instant case is concerned; and the legislative 
history appears to afford no support to appellee’s view that a new test as to 
‘obviousness’ has been embodied in the Act.”); In re O’Keefe, 202 F.2d 767, 772 
(C.C.P.A. 1953) (quoting In re Bisley, 197 F.2d 355, 363 (C.C.P.A. 1952)) (“[T]he 
conception of a new and useful improvement must be considered along with the actual 
means of achieving it in determining the presence or absence of invention.”); New 
Wrinkle, Inc. v. Watson, 206 F.2d 421, 422 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (“Nothing in these slight 
variations in procedure is sufficient to give rise to invention. Our conclusion would 
be the same under any plausible view of the criteria for invention laid down by the 
new Patent Act which became effective while this appeal was pending.”);. 
 300. Rich, supra note 88, at 36 (citing Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 
224 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1955)). 
 301. Lyon, 224 F.2d at 535. 
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valid “twenty or thirty years ago . . . [under] the accepted standards of 
that time,” but within twenty or twenty-five years before the Act of 
1952 “it is almost certain that the claims would have been held 
invalid.”302 After recognizing that the requirement of “‘invention’ 
became perhaps the most baffling concept in the whole catalogue of 
judicial efforts to provide postulates for indefinitely varying 
occasion,” Hand concluded that “a legislature, whose will the courts 
have undertaken to proliferate, must be free to reinstate the courts’ 
initial interpretation, even though it may have been obscured by a 
series of later comments whose upshot is at best hazy.”303 
Judge Hand’s decision turned heads and met criticism.304 But he 
stuck to his guns. Five years later, in 1960, he issued another opinion, 
this one in Reiner v. I. Leon Co., reaffirming his earlier analysis and 
indicating that he understood the underlying reason for § 103,305 “to 
change the slow but steady drift of judicial decision that had been 
hostile to patents.”306 “Congress deliberately meant to restore the old 
definition,” said Hand, “and to raise it from a judicial gloss to a 
statutory command.”307 Beyond recognizing what Congress did, he 
also provided a compelling analysis of the nonobviousness of the 
claimed invention he confronted, reversing a finding of invalidity.308 
In his Kettering Address, Judge Rich later praised these opinions 
as “realistically apprais[ing] and appreciat[ing] what section 103 had 
 
 302. Id. at 534–35. 
 303. Id. at 536–37. 
 304. See Patents—In General—Prior Inventor’s Early Abandonment of 
Invention Prevents Finding of a Public Use; Patent Act of 1952 Held to Repudiate 
Recent Supreme Court Standards of Inventiveness, 69 HARV. L. REV. 388, 390–91 
(1955) (“The court in the instant case assumed that these Supreme Court decisions 
had replaced the standards of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood with stricter, if undefined, 
criteria; but it held that the earlier standards were restored by the 1952 act. It seems 
more likely, however, that the recent Supreme Court cases reflect a change of attitude 
in applying the standards rather than a change in the standards themselves . . . . 
Although § 103 . . . abolished the ‘flash of genius’ test if it ever existed, that test was 
not in issue in the present case. It is doubtful that § 103 made any other changes in the 
standard of inventiveness . . . . It is difficult to see why Congress would adopt the 
standard utilized by the Supreme Court and at the same time would tacitly repudiate 
the Court’s recent application of that standard.”); see also 1952 Patent Act Held to 
Change Standard of Invention, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1231, 1234 (1955) (“In spite of the 
hope expressed by the Revisor the new standard of invention has not been helpful in 
clarifying the law. It appears to have caused even more confusion than existed 
previously since no other court has agreed with the instant court in its interpretation.”). 
 305. See Rich, supra note 88, at 37. 
 306. Reiner v. I. Leon, 285 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1960). 
 307. See id. 
 308. See id. at 503–04. 
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done, namely, to restore the law to what it had been 20 or 30 years 
earlier.”309 Despite Judge Hand’s desire for the Supreme Court to take 
one of his cases to resolve the issue he addressed, it did not do so.310 
Thus, while helpful, nationwide recognition of the elimination of the 
invention requirement would have to wait. 
2. Graham v. John Deere Co. 
Instead of granting review in one of Judge Hand’s cases, the 
Supreme Court later granted certiorari in 1965 in four cases involving 
three patents. Then, in 1966, the Court issued two opinions in these 
cases, one entitled Graham v. John Deere and the other United States 
v. Adams.311 The opinion in Graham in particular represented 
somewhat of a triumph for the patent bar and the drafters of the Patent 
Act of 1952.  
The opinion begins by stating the Court’s ultimate conclusion: 
“[T]he 1952 Act was intended to codify judicial precedents embracing 
the principal long ago announced by this Court in Hotchkiss v. 
Greenwood, and . . . while the clear language of § 103 places emphasis 
on an inquiry into obviousness, the general level of innovation 
necessary to sustain patentability remains the same.”312 Moreover, the 
Court stated that “[i]t is the duty of the Commissioner of Patents and 
of the courts in the administration of the patent system to give effect 
 
 309. Rich, supra note 193, at 869–70; see also Frost, supra note 26, at 348–
49 (quoting Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224 F.2d 530, 537 (2d Cir. 1955)) 
(“Perhaps the most noteworthy early opinion was that of Judge Learned Hand in Lyon 
v. Bausch and Lomb. Judge Learned Hand in this decision pointed out that a more 
strict test of patentability appeared to exist in the recent Supreme Court decisions, 
concluded that Section 103 restored the state of the law to that of an earlier day when 
the Supreme Court was less strict, and would end up observing that ‘[c]ertainly a 
legislature whose will the courts have undertaken to proliferate, must be free to 
reinstate the courts’ initial interpretation, even though it may have been obscured by 
a series of late comments whose upshot is at best hazy.’”). 
 310. See Rich, supra note 193, at 870. 
 311. See generally Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966); United 
States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966). 
 312. Graham, 383 U.S. at 3–4 (citation omitted). This statement contradicted 
Federico’s commentary. Federico, supra note 14, at 183 (“While it is not believed that 
Congress intended any radical change in the level of invention or patentable novelty, 
nevertheless, it is believed that some modification was intended in the direction of 
moderating the extreme degrees of strictness exhibited by a number of judicial 
opinions over the past dozen or more years; that is, that some change of attitude more 
favorable to patents was hoped for. This is indicated by the language used in section 
103 as well as by the general tenor of remarks of the Committees in the reports and 
particular comments.”). 
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to the constitutional standard by appropriate application, in each case, 
of the statutory scheme of the Congress.”313 In both respects, the patent 
bar had room to fear that lower courts would find that § 103 did not 
really eliminate the invention requirement.  
The remainder of the opinion, however, provided more hope. 
The Court explained that “[t]he major distinction is that Congress has 
emphasized ‘nonobviousness’ as the operative test of the section, 
rather than the less definite ‘invention’ language of Hotchkiss that 
Congress thought had led to ‘a large variety’ of expressions in 
decisions and writings.”314 The Court, furthermore, pointed out that 
“[i]n the title itself the Congress used the phrase ‘Conditions for 
patentability; non-obvious subject matter,’ thus focusing upon 
‘nonobviousness’ rather than ‘invention.’”315 
The opinion also made clear that there was no “flash of creative 
genius” test.316 The Court found it “apparent that Congress intended 
by the last sentence of § 103 to abolish the test it believed this Court 
announced the controversial phrase ‘flash of creative genius,’ used in 
Cuno.”317 In a somewhat throwaway line in a footnote, the Court 
explained that, “[a]lthough some writers and lower courts found in the 
language connotations as to the frame of mind of inventors, none were 
so intended.”318 
The opinion then laid out a four-part test to determine 
obviousness:  
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; 
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be 
ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. 
Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject 
matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial 
success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be 
utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the 
subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or 
nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy.319 
Immediate reaction to the Supreme Court’s decisions reflected 
skepticism that patents would survive the nonobviousness test 
embraced in the decisions, yet hope that the Court and the Patent 
 
 313. Graham, 383 U.S. at 6. 
 314. Id. at 14. 
 315. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 316. Id. at 15. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. at 15 n.7. 
 319. Id. at 17–18. 
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Office would both apply nonobviousness as a uniform standard.320 
That said, in 1966 the Patent Office finally stopped referring to the 
“requirement of invention.”321  
Later, Judge Rich would state that “[a]ll things considered, § 103 
fared well” in these cases.322 In his view, “[t]he most important 
question answered in Graham was whether § 103 replaced ‘invention’ 
as a test for patentability, so that it is legally dead.” 323 As he read the 
opinions, “[t]he answer is ‘Yes.’”324 He explained, “The circumstantial 
evidence of this is that . . . the Supreme Court applied no other test, 
deciding the validity of the patent in each case according to the 
obviousness inquiry specified in § 103.”325 In short, there was reason 
to think that the invention requirement was not, in fact, legally dead. 
3. Anderson’s-Black Rock and Sakraida 
As it turned out, the invention requirement was not really dead, 
and there was more work to do. In two cases decided by the Supreme 
Court in the next decade—Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement 
Salvage Co.326 and Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.327—the Court injected 
 
 320. See Charles R. Haworth, Patents—Patentability—Section 103 of the 
Patent Act of 1952 Construed, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1405, 1409–10 (1966) (“The decisions 
in the principal cases bring little comfort to those who believe that the Supreme Court 
is steadily eroding the value of a patent system by striking down nearly every patent 
to come up for review. The Court’s opinion does, however, enable the lower courts to 
apply more uniform tests in litigation. . . . Perhaps, as the Court hoped, the direction 
of inquiry toward nonobviousness will also bring an end to the ‘notorious difference’ 
in the standards applied by the Court and the Patent Office.”). 
 321. Swain, supra note 140, at 19 (“Even the Patent Office found it hard to 
accept the fact that the ‘invention’ test for patentability had been replaced with a ‘non-
obviousness’ standard. It was not until 1966 that the Patent Office stopped referring 
to ‘invention’ as the test for patentability.”). 
 322. Rich, supra note 88, at 37. Another later commentator declared that “in 
that moment it appeared that a century of patent law confusion had come to an end.” 
Robert T. Edell, The Supreme Court and Section 103, 5 APLA Q.J. 99, 99 (1977) 
(“On February 21, 1966, some fourteen years after the enactment of Title 35, United 
States Code, the Supreme Court of the United States entered its decisions in the now-
famous ‘trilogy’ of patent cases, and in that moment it appeared that a century of 
patent law confusion had come to an end.”). 
 323. Rich, supra note 88, at 40. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. 
 326. See generally Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 
396 U.S. 57 (1969). 
 327. See generally Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976). 
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uncertainty into the nonobviousness analysis in part by seeming to 
continue to apply the invention requirement.  
In Anderson’s-Black Rock, the Supreme Court’s opinion referred 
to the “question of invention,” stated that filling a long-felt want and 
enjoying commercial success “without invention” will not make 
patentability, and concluded that the use of old elements in 
combination “was not an invention by the obvious-nonobvious 
standard.”328 The Court also stated that no “synergistic result is argued 
here.”329 
In Sakraida, the Court’s opinion likewise stated that “[i]t has 
long been clear that the Constitution requires that there be some 
‘invention’ to be entitled to patent protection” and quoted Great 
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp. twice for 
the proposition that courts must be careful with combination patent 
claims to “find[] invention” because “without invention” there is not 
patentability.330 And the Court again referred to the issue of synergy.331 
In response, Judge Rich returned to his speaking and writing 
crusade. After Anderson’s-Black Rock, he gave a speech and 
published a paper entitled Laying the Ghost of the ‘Invention’ 
Requirement.332 After Sakraida, he gave a speech and published a 
paper entitled Why and How Section 103 Came to Be.333 In both of 
these efforts he continued his work to eliminate the confusion 
regarding the elimination of the invention requirement.334 He 
downplayed the significance of the Supreme Court’s two recent 
cases.335 He pointed out that the Ninth Circuit had  
answered the argument that [a] patent was invalid for failure to meet the 
[synergy] test by saying that that contention suggests an analytical approach 
directly contrary to § 103 which, carried to its logical conclusion, would 
 
 328. Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc., 396 U.S. at 60–63. 
 329. Id. at 61. 
 330. Sakraida, 425 U.S. at 279–83. 
 331. See id. at 282. 
 332. See generally Rich, supra note 88. 
 333. See generally Rich, supra note 20. 
 334. Rich, supra note 88, at 27 (“I am discussing it again because I and many 
others see that confusion remains rampant in the courts and has arisen even in the 
Supreme Court, which fact is creating even more confusion in the lower courts.”). 
 335. Id. at 44 (“I do not believe the Supreme Court sees the inconsistencies 
between Graham and Black Rock that get patent lawyers so excited and I think that if 
it ever has to resolve the matter it will stick with Graham and say—for face-saving 
reasons—that Black Rock is really to the same effect.”). 
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preclude the patenting of virtually every mechanical or electrical device 
since they are all combinations of old elements.336  
He also sought to focus attention back on Graham.337  
Furthermore, Judge Rich countered the expressed views of other 
judges, such as Judge Edwards of the Sixth Circuit, who in 1977 
publicly disagreed with Judge Rich, saying “the requirement of 
invention for patentability is alive and well in the Supreme Court of 
the United States, and as a consequence, in all of the federal courts—
and the Patent Office.”338 In response, Judge Rich gave a speech and 
wrote a paper entitled Escaping the Tyranny of Words—Is Evolution 
in Legal Thinking Impossible?339 In it, he tried a new approach to 
“illuminating the darkness out of which sprang” Judge Edwards’ 
statements,340 explaining that he did “not believe that the requirement 
for ‘invention’ is very much alive in the Supreme Court because, when 
 
 336. Id. at 44–45. 
 337. Rich, supra note 20, at 1:203 (“At the tender age of 14 [section 103] was 
adopted by a kindly Supreme Court. A few years later, upon discovering that it was a 
bastard, the Court decided it would at least have to change the name of the child, if it 
was to stay in the family, from unobviousness to synergism, thus covering up its 
natural origins with a pretense of legitimacy.”). 
 338. George Edwards, That Clumsy Word “Nonobviousness”, in NON-
OBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY 3:204, 3:208 (John F. 
Witherspoon, ed., 1978) (“I supposed Judge Rich would, at least in theory, subscribe 
to all of what I have just said. But, nonetheless, as I read him, he appears to assert two 
propositions with which I cannot agree . . . . I suggest then that the requirement of 
invention for patentability is alive and well in the Supreme Court of the United States, 
and as a consequence, in all of the federal courts—and the Patent Office.”). 
 339. Giles S. Rich, Escaping the Tyranny of Words—Is Evolution in Legal 
Thinking Possible?, in NON-OBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF 
PATENTABILITY 3:301, 3:303–04 (John F. Witherspoon, ed., 1978) (citations omitted) 
(“A principal reason Mr. Dunner asked me here today was a speech before a group of 
patent lawyers last November in Washington by a U.S. Court of Appeals judge 
entitled ‘That Clumsy Word “Nonobviousness”!’ We who heard it suffered instant 
shock from the realization which he brought home to us, that a high federal judge, 
who properly felt bound to follow the Supreme Court’s pronouncements, believed 
notwithstanding the 1952 Patent Act and Graham v. John Deere, that ‘[t]he 
requirement of invention for patentability is alive and well in the Supreme Court of 
the United States, and as a consequence in all of the federal courts—and the Patent 
Office,’ and that ‘[t]he elements of novelty, utility and non-obviousness . . . constitute 
the statutory definition of “invention,”’ and that [there is a synergism requirement.]”). 
 340. Id. at 3:304 (“Oh, the tyranny of words! And the most tyrannical of all 
are those related words ‘inventor,’ ‘invention,’ ‘invents,’ and ‘invented.’ I can’t help 
wondering what those terms mean to the good judge and why they have such a magical 
power over him that he deems ‘nonobviousness’ to be a ‘clumsy’ word by 
comparison. How does one go about illuminating the darkness out of which sprang 
the statements I have quoted? I have tried it before, apparently with something less 
than total success, so I will try a new approach.”). 
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one follows the carefully considered dictates of the Court, that old 
requirement will be seen to have been substituted in the statutory 
requirement for nonobviousness.”341 
Ultimately all of Judge Rich’s hard work paid off. While 
synergism was “threatening to become a fourth requirement of 
patentability”342 and “created confusion in many circles, that is now a 
thing of the past . . . . In short, the fruit of Judge Rich’s labors has 
withstood the test of time.”343 
G. Fortuity 
In addition to all of the other factors, fortuity played a role in the 
success of the legislative reform efforts.  
1. Timing of Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket 
Equipment Corp. 
The first fortuity was the coincidence of the issuance of the 
Supreme Court’s opinions in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. 
Supermarket Equipment Corp. and the meetings of the Drafting and 
Coordinating Committees.344 As discussed above, the day the opinions 
were published in the New York Times they were read to the Drafting 
Committee, and they ultimately persuaded the Coordinating 
Committee meeting the next day to replace the case law’s invention 
 
 341. Id. at 3:324. 
 342. Janice M. Mueller, An Interview with Judge Giles S. Rich, U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 75, 76 (1999) (“Back in 1978, 
‘synergism’ was threatening to become a fourth requirement of patentability in 
addition to the trio of novelty, utility, and nonobviousness, or at least an unnecessary 
complication of the nonobviousness requirement, due to the erroneous thinking of 
some judges.”). 
 343. See Witherspoon, supra note 288, at 160–61. Judge Rich continued to 
speak and write about § 103 the rest of his life. See, e.g., Giles S. Rich, Foreword, 
PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW (1998) (“Section 103 had no statutory predecessor and 
replaced a judge-made case law requirement for the presence of ‘invention.’ It was 
sort of mystery. The Supreme Court once said that invention could not be defined. 
The requirement realistically said nothing more than to be patentable an invention had 
to be the result of invention, a sort of ‘you know it when you see it’ proposition. 
Beware, therefore, of opinions prior to January 1, 1953, when the act took effect, and 
to be safe, for a decade thereafter, because the courts, the Patent Office, and many 
lawyers were slow to take in the effect of Section 103. Old habits of thought are 
broken slowly.”). 
 344. See Rich, supra note 88, at 32. 
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requirement with a statutory nonobviousness requirement.345 There are 
at least two other important fortuities. 
2. Coincidence 
A second example of fortuity was the coincidence that the same 
subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary held 
responsibility for both the revision of law (which included the 
codification of statutes) and legislation related to patents.346 As 
explained by Philip Swain, “[w]hile codification could have involved 
(as it often does) simply collecting existing statutes and laws, and 
unifying them without significant alteration, in this case,” given the 
subcommittee’s responsibility for patent legislation, “codification 
offered the opportunity for the Patent Office to propose important 
changes to the corpus of patent law.”347 
3. Charles Reed 
The third instance of fortuity relates to the Supreme Court’s first 
opinion interpreting the nonobviousness requirement, Graham v. John 
Deere Co., in 1966.348 The Court granted certiorari in the case on 
January 18, 1965,349 and in its companion cases, Calmar, Inc. v. Cook 
Chemical Co., Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Cook Chemical Co., and 
United States v. Adams, on March 29, 1965.350 On April 19, within 
 
 345. See Rich, supra note 88, at 32. 
 346. Federico, supra note 27, at 88 (“In 1949 and for a few years thereafter, 
the same Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary (Subcommittee No. 
4, number later changed to 3) was in charge of the subject of revision of the laws as 
well as patents.”); Rich, supra note 36, at 64 (“It was a fortuitous circumstance that 
the same subcommittee (then known as Subcommittee No. 4 and later changed to No. 
3) had jurisdiction over both patents and the revision of the laws.”); Harris, supra note 
13, at 658 (“By a fortunate circumstance, the Patent, Trade-mark and Copyright 
Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee was also charged with this revision 
function . . . .”); Zinn, supra note 175, at 2508 (“During that Congress it was 
suggested that the patent laws be revised and Title 35 reenacted with such revisions 
especially in view of the fact that the House Committee on the Judiciary—which had 
succeeded to the functions of the Committee on Revision of the Laws under the 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946—had jurisdiction of revision of statutes and 
of legislation relating to patents.”). 
 347. Swain, supra note 140, at 18.  
 348. See generally Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
 349. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 85 S. Ct. 652 (1965) (granting certiorari). 
 350. See Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chem. Co. & Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Cook 
Chem. Co., 85 S. Ct. 1082 (1965) (granting certiorari and consolidating cases); United 
States v. Adams, 85 S. Ct. 1090 (1965) (granting certiorari). 
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three weeks of the last grant of certiorari, Supreme Court Justice Tom 
Clark offered a clerkship to Charles Reed, a law student at South 
Texas College of Law.351 Reed held undergraduate and graduate 
degrees in chemical engineering and fluid mechanics and obtained 
experience prior to law school as a research chemical engineer.352 
Moreover, while in law school and indeed at the same time he obtained 
his offer to clerk for Justice Clark, Reed “studied patent law . . . in a 
course taught by Tom Arnold of Houston, Texas.”353 “According to 
Mr. Arnold, a thorough understanding of the ‘Kettering Address’ was 
required to obtain a passing grade in his course.”354  
At this point it is important to know more about the Kettering 
Address. In 1963, the Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Research 
Institute of the George Washington University awarded Judge Rich 
the Charles F. Kettering Award,355 and in 1964 Judge Rich gave what 
is now known as the Kettering Address as his acceptance speech.356 
Importantly, the Journal of the Patent Office Society published the 
speech as an article in December 1964.357 Philip Swain has called this 
speech and article “[p]erhaps the most important speech and article” 
ever given and written by Rich.358 Swain made this sweeping statement 
because, as explained by John Witherspoon, “a comparison of the 
Graham opinion [authored by Justice Clark] with the ‘Kettering 
Address’ leaves little doubt that Judge Rich’s thinking had a profound 
influence on the Court.”359 
 
 351. See Letter from Charles D. Reed to Elden S. Magaw (Apr. 19, 1965) (on 
file with Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin). 
 352. See Charles A. Reed, Kile Park Reed & Houtteman PLLC, 
https://www.kilepark.com/charles-reed [https://perma.cc/MU6X-H7XN]. 
 353. See Witherspoon, supra note 288, at 160. 
 354. Id. For a detailed description of how Arnold, upon learning that Reed 
would serve as a law clerk for Justice Clark, assigned and stressed the importance of 
memorizing the Kettering Address to Reed in the last patent law class of the semester, 
see Tom Arnold, My Friend, Giles Rich, 9 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 39, 45–48 (1999). Reed 
later expressed surprise to learn that his “role was more like that of the robot R2D2 
from the movie Star Wars. I was preconditioned and programmed, sent forward to the 
Supreme Court to get the word across. The ‘word,’ of course, was what was truly 
intended by the drafters of Section 103.” Charles D. Reed, Some Reflections on 
Graham v. John Deere Co., in NONOBVIOUSNESS–THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF 
PATENTABILITY 2:301, 2:301 (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1978). 
 355. See Swain, supra note 140, at 22, 29. 
 356. See John F. Witherspoon, A Tribute to Judge Giles S. Rich, 2 (2017) 
https://cpip.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/31/2017/04/Witherspoon-A-Tribute-
to-Judge-Giles-S-Rich.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZM2C-T4HT]. 
 357. See generally Rich, supra note 193. 
 358. Swain, supra note 140, at 22. 
 359. Witherspoon, supra note 288, at 160. 
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While Witherspoon may have had little doubt in that regard, the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Graham v. John Deere Co. does not cite 
the Kettering Address or, for that matter, any other text written by 
Rich.360 Nevertheless, I have been able to confirm Rich’s influence on 
the four-part test articulated in Graham. I visited the law library at the 
University of Texas and found two handwritten pages of notes on 
yellow legal paper in Justice Clark’s files entitled “Judge Giles Rich 
CCPA Kettering Address.”361 Indeed, beyond summarizing many of 
Judge Rich’s views articulated in the Kettering Address, it is 
particularly noteworthy that the notes paraphrase in full Judge Rich’s 
four-part test from footnote 36 of the Kettering Address printed in the 
December 1964 issue of the Journal of the Patent Office Society.362 
The text of the Graham opinion articulates a strikingly similar four-
part test.363 
Justice Clark’s papers also include a list of references, the first 
fifteen of which are clearly drawn from the Kettering Address given 
 
 360. See id. 
 361. Notes on Judge Giles Rich CCPA Kettering Address (on file with Tom 
C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin). 
 362. See id. (“Suggested approach—§ 103 itself (1) What are diff. between the 
‘invention’ and ‘prior art’? (2) What is disclosed by prior art presumed to have been 
available to the inventor[?] (3) What was the level of ordinary skill in the art at the 
time the invention was made? (4) Other fact issues related to circumstances indicative 
of the presence or absence of obviousness, traditionally taken into account in 
determining ‘invention,’ such as long-felt need, immediate copying, sudden 
displacement of existing practices or devices, difficulty of achievement, failure of 
others, etc. Once these facts have been assembled, there remains the ultimate staty’ 
reqmnt of nonobviousness, the 3rd reqmnt for pat’bility which becomes a matter of 
statutory application and as such must be a question of law.”). 
 363. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966) (citation 
omitted) (“While the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law, the § 103 
condition, which is but one of three conditions, each of which must be satisfied, lends 
itself to several basic factual inquiries. Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior 
art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are 
to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against 
this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is 
determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but 
unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the 
circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. As 
indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy.”). An 
early draft of the opinion comes even closer to Rich’s four steps; handwritten edits 
indicate to reverse the order of the first two steps. See Early Draft Reversing Steps 1 
and 2 of 4 Part Test (on file with Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, 
University of Texas at Austin). 
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the order and citations.364 This list includes two other articles written 
by Rich.365 An early draft of the opinion included in Justice Clark’s 
files cites two of these references identified in the list, one by Rich 
(but not the Kettering Address) and one by Federico.366 These citations 
were removed from the opinion, however, in response to two memos 
from Justice Hugo Black, the last criticizing Justice Clark for relying 
upon statements of the drafters of the Patent Act of 1952.367 
Given these findings, there is no doubt that Rich’s Kettering 
Address, as well as some of his other articles, did indeed influence the 
Supreme Court’s resolution of Graham v. John Deere Co., helping the 
Court to form the four-part test expressed in the opinion. Arnold, 
Reed’s professor, would later report based on statements by Justice 
Clark that the Graham and Adams “opinions, at least essentially, were 
not by Justice Clark, but by Charles Reed, who put as much of Giles 
Rich into them as a law clerk could, as I had indirectly sort of taught 
him he should.”368 Certainly without the publication of the Kettering 
Address in December 1964, Reed taking Arnold’s patent law course 
in the spring of 1965, Arnold’s assignment of the Kettering Address, 
or Reed’s clerkship—indeed any one of this series of events or another 
series of events described by Arnold369—there is no telling if the Court 
 
 364. See List of References (on file with Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law 
Library, University of Texas at Austin). 
 365. See id. (identifying, inter alia, “Principles of Patentability, Rich 28 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 393, 42 JPOS 75”; “Rich, Congressional Intent—Or, Who Wrote the 
Pat Act of 1952, 11 Pat. Procurement and Exploitation, BNA 1963, pp. 61-78”). 
 366. See Citations in Early Draft (on file with Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton 
Law Library, University of Texas at Austin) (citing Rich, supra note 36, at 61–78; 
“Frederico [sic], Commentary on the New Patent Act, in 35 U.S.C.A. 1, at 19–23”). 
 367. See Memorandum from Justice Hugo Black to Justice Clark (Jan. 11, 
1966) (on file with Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas 
at Austin) (“In view of the language and history of the patent laws, I cannot treat the 
term ‘invention’ as a ‘Gossamer’ or ‘illustive’ [sic] concept which Congress could 
ignore or repudiate at will. It has been given substance, solidity and precision for more 
than 150 years in the Constitution, statutes, court opinions, and administrative actions. 
I cannot believe that the 1952 Congress intended to scuttle this well-established test 
and substitute a far less exacting one than the Constitutional requires. And, 
incidentally, I think it would be very unwise to attribute such a revolutionary prospect 
to Congress on the basis of what patent lawyers or commentators, or even 
Congressmen said about the 1952 Act after it had already been passed.”). 
 368. See Arnold, supra note 354, at 48.  
 369. See id. (“Out of such coincidences as a Justice Department liaison, 
becoming a trial lawyer and a law professor, being in trial in Dallas, when a Supreme 
Court justice visited, a trial judge’s invitation to meet the justice, the professor having 
a unique student then in his class, who had memorized what Giles Rich has written, 
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would have understood the basis for the legislative intervention that 
occurred in 1952, the long-felt need for improvement, the problems 
emanating from the Court with respect to the invention requirement, 
the depth of the confusion related to it, and the sense of urgency that 
all motivated those who drafted the Patent Act of 1952.370  
There is, however, reason to think that the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Graham v. John Deere Co. might have been substantially 
different without Rich’s influence. The final opinion issued by the 
Supreme Court includes points and language reminiscent of Rich’s 
discussion of various issues examined, not only in the Kettering 
Address but also in one of Rich’s other articles cited in the early draft, 
Principles of Patentability. For example, beyond articulating a similar 
four-part test, the Court’s opinion, like the Kettering Address, 
identifies nonobviousness as the third requirement of patentability.371 
The Court’s opinion, moreover, like Principles of Patentability, 
understands the Constitution to identify the purpose behind the patent 
system as being “[t]o promote the progress of . . . useful Arts,” without 
including the term “science.”372 
 
. . . out of such a series of coincidences was the patent system saved from what Giles 
and I had perceived as almost certain oblivion for some indeterminate but long time.”). 
 370. While Reed may have called Justice Clark’s attention to the Kettering 
Address and worked to ensure the Court’s opinion in Graham included a version of 
the four-part test it advocated, an amicus brief filed by the Dean Page Keeton and 
Professor E. Ernest Goldstein from the University of Texas, curiously titled “Brief 
Amicus Curiae in Support of 35 USC 103,” attached the Kettering Address as an 
exhibit. Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of 35 USC 103, Graham v. John Deere Co., 
383 U.S. 1 (1966) (“[W]e attach hereto as Appendix A, and respectfully urge detailed 
study and consideration of, ‘The Vague Concept of Invention as Replaced by Sec. 103 
of the 1952 Patent Act,’ delivered by Judge Rich in June 1964 on the occasion of his 
accepting the Kettering Award from the Patent Trademark and Copyright Foundation 
of the George Washington University.”). 
 371. Compare Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12 (1966) (“The Act 
sets out the conditions of patentability in three sections. An analysis of the structure 
of these three sections indicates that patentability is dependent upon three explicit 
conditions: novelty and utility as articulated and defined in § 101 and § 102, and 
nonobviousness, the new statutory formulation, as set out in § 103.”), with Rich, supra 
note 193, at 866 (“I would like to inject a new term into the language so we can discuss 
the matter rationally. I would like to call it the THIRD REQUIREMENT of 
patentability . . . . Section 101 says inventions must be new and useful, requirement 
one and two; section 102 defines novelty; and section 103 lays down the third 
requirement.”). 
 372. Compare Graham, 383 U.S. at 5 (“At the outset it must be remembered 
that the federal patent power stems from a specific constitutional provision which 
authorizes the Congress ‘To promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.’”), with 
Rich, supra note 245, at 395 (“It is reasonably predictable that the last statement will 
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The Supreme Court’s opinion no doubt could have been more 
specific on the point that the nonobviousness inquiry replaced the old 
invention inquiry given its problems, a point made by Rich in the 
Kettering Address.373 An early draft of the Court’s opinion, however, 
was more specific on that point.374 The draft, for example, criticized 
the old invention requirement in more explicit terms, stating that “[w]e 
would be less than candid if we did not also admit, however, that 
Hotchkiss brought into American patent law an unfortunate 
nomenclature which has, perhaps, added confusion to it.”375 Moreover, 
a draft stated that “[t]his Court has striven to apply the Hotchkiss rule 
albeit an analysis of its patent decisions reveals some ambiguities.”376 
Elsewhere the draft referred to “the troublesome and elusive 
dependence upon the concept of ‘invention.’”377 Another draft referred 
to the invention requirement as a “gossamer” concept.378 Elsewhere in 
an early draft Justice Clark referred to “evidence that the Act was not 
entirely a codification,” referring to the views of “several of the 
principal drafters of the Act” and citing both Federico’s Commentary 
and Rich’s Congressional Intent—or, Who Wrote the Patent Act of 
1952.379 One draft stated that “[s]ection 103 avoids the elusive concept 
of ‘invention.’”380 Another draft stated that “the criteria set out avoid 
the troublesome and illusive dependence upon the concept of 
 
be questioned on the ground that the constitutional purpose behind the patent system 
is, ‘To promote the progress of Science and useful Arts,’ but that would be a 
misconstruction . . . . To say that the purpose of the patent system is to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts involves an erroneous reading of what is actually 
written in the Constitution.”). 
 373. See Rich, supra note 193, at 869 (stating that “the 1952 Patent Act was 
intended . . . to replace the ‘standard of invention,’ which never was a standard, with 
a requirement of unobviousness to a particular kind of person at a particular time”). 
 374. See Candid Statement Regarding Hotchkiss (on file with Tom C. Clark 
Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin). 
 375. Id. 
 376. Statement Regarding Ambiguities after Hotchkiss (on file with Tom C. 
Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin). 
 377. Statement Regarding Troublesome and Elusive Dependence upon the 
Concept of Invention (on file with Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, 
University of Texas at Austin). 
 378. Memorandum from Justice Clark to Justice Black (Jan. 6) (on file with 
Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin). 
 379. References to Evidence Not Entirely Codification (on file with Tom C. 
Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin). 
 380. Statement about Avoiding Elusive Concept of Invention (on file with 
Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin). 
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‘invention.’”381 Finally, an early draft circulated to the other Justices 
indicated that the inquiry had “shifted” from invention to 
nonobviousness.382 In each of these ways, the earlier drafts suggested 
the elimination of the invention requirement. 
But Justice Clark removed all of this language during the editing 
process. He did so primarily, as far as I can tell, in response to criticism 
from Justice Black, who circulated two memos to Justice Clark. In the 
first memo, Justice Black indicated he was “troubled by the general 
slant” of the opinion because he thought it would “abandon[] the idea 
of invention or ‘discovery’ in adopting as a complete substitute the 
idea of the concept of obviousness.”383 He indicated he did “not believe 
that the 1952 Act was intended to make such a revolutionary change 
in the idea of patentability as many might read your opinion to 
suggest.”384 Moreover, he “seriously doubt[ed] the constitutional 
power of Congress to repudiate the idea of ‘invention’ in connection 
with patents.”385 
Justice Clark responded to Justice Black’s first memo by 
pointing out that, while he had added the phrase “couched as it was in 
so gossamer a concept as invention,” he would be glad to strike it and 
also would have no objection to leaving out the phrase about the 
“elusive” invention requirement.386 Justice Black, however, responded 
with his second memo indicating, essentially, that without additional 
changes he would be unable to join the opinion.387 As with his first 
memo, he expressed his disagreement with the interpretation of the 
Patent Act of 1952 as “shift[ing] patentability and validity inquiries 
from invention to non-obviousness.”388 He did “not believe that 
Congress did this, intended to do it, or could have done it consistently 
with its limited power granted by Section 8 of the Constitution.”389 He 
 
 381. Statement about Criteria Avoiding Troublesome and Illusive 
Dependence upon the Concept of Invention (on file with Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton 
Law Library, University of Texas at Austin). 
 382. See Memorandum from Justice Black to Justice Clark (Jan. 6) (on file 
with Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin); 
Memorandum from Justice Black to Justice Clark (Jan. 11) (on file with Tom C. Clark 
Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin). 
 383. Memorandum from Justice Black to Justice Clark (Jan. 6), supra note 
382. 
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. 
 386. Memorandum from Justice Clark to Justice Black, supra note 378. 
 387. See Memorandum from Justice Black to Justice Clark (Jan. 11), supra 
note 382. 
 388. Id. 
 389. Id. 
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could not believe that “Congress intended to scuttle this well-
established test and substitute a far less exacting one than the 
Constitution requires.”390 “And incidentally,” he added with reference 
to Justice Clark’s citations to Federico, Rich, and Representative 
Crumpacker, he thought “it would be very unwise to attribute such a 
revolutionary prospect to Congress on the basis of what patent lawyers 
or commentators, or even Congressmen said about the 1952 Act after 
it had already been passed.”391 Justice Black also made it clear that his 
interpretation of the 1952 Patent Act was that “the ‘non-obviousness’ 
test of Section 103 was intended to be an additional or supplemental 
test and not a substitute for the old novelty, utility and invention 
test.”392 
Later, Justice Clark circulated a revised opinion only to Justice 
Black, stating that he was “not circulating until after you see this latest 
draft and give me your reaction. Hope this is okay now.”393 Notably, 
however, at least Justice Harlan harbored the exact opposite view of 
the issue as compared to Justice Black. Justice Harlan also sent a 
memo to Justice Clark, his memo stating that Justice Clark  
use[d] language which might indicate that the standard of patentability is a 
constitutional one, whereas I feel pretty sure that you would agree that 
patentability in a particular case must be judged against the standards of the 
statute, there being no claim made in any of these cases about the statute’s 
constitutionality.394 
In the end, the opinion did not take a clear position as between 
the diverging views of Justices Black and Harlan.395 The closest the 
opinion comes to addressing the question is the following statement: 
Within the scope established by the Constitution, Congress may set out 
conditions and tests for patentability. It is the duty of the Commissioner of 
Patents and of the courts in the administration of the patent system to give 
effect to the constitutional standard by appropriate application, in each case, 
of the statutory scheme of the Congress.396 
In this way, the Supreme Court took the middle road, preserving its 
ability in future cases to decide that the Constitution demanded more 
 
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. 
 392. Id. 
 393. Recirculation Only to Black (Jan. 20) (on file with Tom C. Clark Papers, 
Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin). 
 394. Memorandum from Justice Harlan to Justice Clark (Feb. 11) (on file with 
Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin). 
 395. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). 
 396. Id. 
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rigor than the patent statute.397 Without Rich’s articles, however, the 
Court may have taken the stronger position advocated by Justice 
Black, making clear that the old invention requirement remained alive 
and well.398 
Subsequent events indicated the high level of respect Justice 
Clark held for Rich, Justice Clark’s knowledge of the Kettering 
Address, and Justice Clark’s own views on whether Justice Black or 
Justice Harlan was correct. Indeed, shortly after he retired from the 
Supreme Court, Justice Clark sat by designation on the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals with Rich in December, 1967,399 and the 
same year, Justice Clark gave a speech at the New Jersey Patent Law 
Association borrowing the phrase “mish-mash” from Judge Rich’s 
Kettering Address.400 Lost in this exchange of memoranda at the 
Supreme Court was any clear indication what Justice Clark himself 
believed on the disputed issue of whether the invention requirement 
had been replaced by the nonobviousness requirement. But his speech 
to the New Jersey Patent Law Association made clear his own views 
on this issue.401  
In the speech, Justice Clark explained that the invention 
requirement was the cause of problems in patent law in the late 
1940s.402 He highlighted that in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. 
Supermarket Equipment Corporation, decided in 1950, “two 
distinguished Justices whose joint service on the court then spanned 
almost a quarter of a century, declared that it was ‘the standard of 
 
 397. See id. 
 398. See id. at 3. 
 399. See Documents Related to Court of Customs and Patent Appeals Cases 
(on file with Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at 
Austin). Indeed, Justice Clark authored the opinion of the court applying Graham, 
concluding that “appellant’s claims comply with the conditions for patentability set 
forth in section 103 and revers[ing] the decision of the board.” Application of 
Wiggins, 397 F.2d 356, 357 (C.C.P.A. 1968). 
 400. Compare Mr. Justice Clark, Patents and the Supreme Court, Address to 
New Jersey Patent Law Association 3 (Apr. 4, 1967) (on file with Tom C. Clark 
Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin) (“The title that your 
President-elect has assigned to me tonight begs all description. It is: ‘Patents and the 
Supreme Court.’ Judge Rich would call it ‘a mish mash’!”), with Rich, supra note 
193, at 867–68 (stating that “[w]hat we have today is a mish-mash,” that “members 
of the bar have a lot to answer for in creating and perpetuating the mish-mash,” and 
“in the legislature the mish-mash has been described in detail”). 
 401. See Clark, supra note 400, at 3. 
 402. Id. at 6 (“In my view the injection into the law of the doctrine known as 
‘the requirement for invention’ was the culprit.”). 
496 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
invention’ that controlled.”403 Justice Clark was referring to the 
concurring opinion authored by Justice Douglas and joined by Justice 
Black, who entered service on the Supreme Court in 1939 and 1937 
respectively (and thus whose service in 1950 totaled about 24 years, 
just under a quarter of a century). In their concurring opinion in the 
case they said that “[t]he Court now recognizes what has long been 
apparent in our cases: that it is the ‘standard of invention’ that 
controls.”404 Justice Clark, however, in his speech stated that “neither 
the Constitution nor the Congress mentioned such a standard”405 and, 
borrowing a point from the Kettering Address, joked that, “[a]s Judge 
Rich has pointed out, only a Supreme Court could find ‘a standard of 
invention’ in the two words ‘inventors’ and ‘discoveries’ found in 
Clause 8” of the Constitution.406 Even more specifically, he said that 
the opinion in Graham “casts to one side as confusing the label 
‘standard of invention’ and substitutes the test of patentability as laid 
down over 100 years ago in Hotchkiss and as well by the action of the 
Congress, including its 1952 Act.”407 In other words, Justice Clark 
disagreed with Justice Black and instead agreed with Justice Harlan 
and Rich that the invention requirement had been eliminated by 
Congress.  
With knowledge of Justice Clark’s own view on the issue, a 
close study of his opinion for the Supreme Court in Graham reveals 
the careful choices he made to avoid sustaining use of the invention 
requirement.408 As Reed later reflected on the opinion,  
[t]he Court quite clearly stayed away from the use of “invention,” except 
when referring to Hotchkiss, and there was equally careful to speak of 
“patentable invention” and to characterize “inventions” as a “[word] of legal 
art.” And finally in this connection, the opinion points out that Section 103 
 
 403. Id. at 8–9. 
 404. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 
147, 156 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 405. Clark, supra note 400, at 9. 
 406. Compare id. at 10 with Rich, supra note 193, at 861 (“[Courts] also 
proclaimed in all seriousness—and are doing so this very moment—that this 
‘standard’ was to be found in the Constitution, where there are only two words on 
which it could possibly be predicated, the word ‘inventors’ and the word ‘discoveries.’ 
You really have to be on the Supreme Court to find a ‘standard’ there because the 
only way it can work is this: if you think the lower court was wrong in sustaining the 
patent, you proclaim that it applied too low a standard and reverse its decision, saying 
‘That was not an invention.’”). 
 407. Clark, supra note 400, at 18 (emphasis added). 
 408. See Reed, supra note 354, at 2:306. 
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“will permit a more practical test of patentability,” suggesting that 
something new indeed was added by Congress.409 
In short, perhaps as a result of fortuity, Rich’s speeches and articles 
influenced the Supreme Court in Graham to craft an opinion that 
ultimately over time resulted in one of the primary purposes of those 
who drafted the Patent Act of 1952, the replacement of the invention 
requirement with the non-obviousness requirement.  
 
* * * 
 
The factors I have identified—a clear need for legislative 
intervention, the involvement of the patent bar, good drafting, 
legislative stewardship, an article and speaking campaign, judicial 
recognition, and fortuity—contributed to the success of the Patent Act 
of 1952. These factors led to the elimination of the invention 
requirement, “reversed the direction of the Supreme Court’s antipathy 
towards patents and the patent system at the time,”410 and 
“fundamentally transformed the patent system.”411 In the words of 
President George H.W. Bush on the 40th anniversary of the Patent Act 
of 1952, the Act set the stage for remarkable scientific progress based 
on the flourishing of the inventive spirit.412 
II. PATENT REFORM—NOW 
With that review of the Patent Act of 1952, I turn now toward an 
analysis of the present patent system. As it turns out, there is an 
uncanny parallel between the state of patent law today and the state of 
patent law prior to 1952—and there is nearly as much of a need of 
legislative reform now as then. In this Part, therefore, I assess the 
present state of the patent system, and, in particular, the Supreme 
Court’s recent creation of the inventive concept requirement and 
efforts to eliminate it.413 I highlight the problems with the law today, 
 
 409. Reed, supra note 354, at 2:306 (footnotes omitted). 
 410. Special Session, supra note 156, at 141. 
 411. Swain, supra note 140, at 19. 
 412. Id. (“In 1992, in a letter dated December 3, and marking the occasion of 
the 40th anniversary of the 1952 Patent Act, President George Bush wrote: ‘The last 
four decades have witnessed remarkable scientific progress in this country, thanks in 
part to your strong commitment to fostering and promoting the American creative 
genius. Our national security and unparalleled standard of living are the direct result 
of this inventive spirit, which has continued to flourish under the act that you fathered 
40 years ago.’”). 
 413. See infra Section II.A (discussing the need for legislative intervention). 
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the people and groups of people involved today in reform efforts, and 
the circumstances and strategies they might use to their advantage to 
create change.414 Moreover, drawing from the factors that led to the 
success of legislative reform efforts in 1952, I organize my analysis 
around how those same factors may contribute to the success of 
current legislative reform efforts—or hinder it.415 
A. Clear Need for Legislative Intervention 
As in 1952, today there is a clear need for legislative reform. In 
1952 the problem was the invention requirement.416 Today the problem 
is the inventive concept requirement.417 While the two requirements 
share a similar name, they grew out of different patent law doctrines. 
The invention requirement grew out of the doctrine of patentable 
novelty.418 The inventive concept requirement, by contrast, grew out 
of the doctrine of patent eligibility.419 The doctrine of patentable 
novelty asked how different from the prior art a claimed invention 
needed to be to become patentable,420 while the doctrine of patent 
eligibility traditionally asked whether the claimed invention fell 
within one of the statutory subject matter categories or instead merely 
constituted an abstract idea, physical phenomenon, or natural law.421 
 
 414. See infra Section II.B (discussing the involvement of the patent bar in 
pioneering new solutions and reforms in patent law today). 
 415. See infra Section II.C (discussing the potential successes and difficulties 
of reform efforts). 
 416. See generally Swain, supra note 140 (noting that the principle test of 
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(1980) (“[W]e begin, of course, with the language of the statute . . . . This is not to 
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The Supreme Court, however, recently created a two-part test for 
determining eligibility.422 First, the Court explained, “we determine 
whether the claims at issue are directed to one of [the] patent-ineligible 
concepts,” in other words an abstract idea, physical phenomenon, or 
natural law.423 “If so, we then . . . search for an ‘inventive concept.’”424 
In turn, it has explained that the second part of the test—the inventive 
concept requirement—asks whether a patent claim includes a concept 
“sufficient to ‘transform’ [an] abstract idea into a patent-eligible 
application.”425 The Court has said that a claim reciting an abstract 
idea, for example, must include additional features to ensure that the 
claim is more than a drafting effort designed to capture rights to the 
abstract idea.426 To comply with the requirement, the Court says, one 
must do more than simply state the abstract idea and add the words 
“apply it.”427 Simply appending conventional steps specified at a high 
level of generality, it says, is not enough.428 According to the Court, 
neither does specifying a conventional computer implementation429 or 
limiting the claim to a particular technological environment.430 An 
example of what does satisfy the requirement, says the Court, is using 
a mathematical equation in a process designed to solve a technological 
problem.431  
One of the many problems with this inventive concept 
requirement is that lower courts and the Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) have been unable to provide any certainty with respect to 
the question of whether a particular claimed invention meets it, with 
resulting confusion imposed on investors, patent attorneys, patent 
examiners, and judges.432 Like the invention requirement, the 
 
suggest that § 101 has no limits or that it embraces every discovery. The laws of 
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable.”). 
 422. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 218, 221 (2014). 
 423. Id. at 217. 
 424. Id. 
 425. Id. at 221. 
 426. See id. 
 427. Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 
U.S. 66, 72 (2012)). 
 428. See id. 
 429. See id. at 222. 
 430. See id. 
 431. See id. at 223. 
 432. See, e.g., Lefstin, Menell & Taylor, supra note 4, at 561 (“The uncertainty 
and confusion resulting from the Court’s recent jurisprudence [adopting the ‘inventive 
concept’ requirement] create significant problems for many companies and investors 
contemplating research and development projects, as well as for patent prosecutors, 
patent examiners, and patent jurists.”). 
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inventive concept requirement presents a mystical mystery, an 
enigma, a situation of knowing it when you see it, which certainly is 
no way to run an incentive scheme that is supposed to support 
investment in invention and innovation.433 In this respect, beyond 
sharing essentially the same term—“invention” and “inventive”—the 
requirements share the same problem. Moreover, both requirements 
emanated from the Supreme Court and therefore seemingly require 
Congressional intervention to produce real change.434 And finally, the 
problems with the inventive concept requirement—and there are many 
others besides confusion—have been identified by national groups 
who have cried out for reform,435 even if not a national commission 
established by the President. 
Moreover, as with Justice Jackson’s opinion calling out the 
Supreme Court for invalidating almost every patent using the 
invention requirement, judges have spoken loudly about the inventive 
concept requirement.436 They have identified problems with it, 
suggested solutions, and very recently even indicated they favor 
legislative reform. Judge Richard Linn, for example, highlighted 
problems with the inventive concept requirement in Ariosa v. 
Sequenom, a case decided by the Federal Circuit in 2015.437 That case 
involved a patent on a potentially life-saving invention allowing for 
noninvasive detection of birth defects.438 Despite the novelty of the 
discovery involved and the patent claiming its practical use to detect 
birth defects, the court invalidated the patent based on the lack of an 
inventive concept distinguishing the invention from a conventional 
use of a physical phenomenon or natural law.439 Calling attention to 
the inventive concept requirement, Judge Linn explained that its 
breadth “was unnecessary to the decision reached in Mayo” and, 
moreover, lamented that the “case represent[ed] the consequence—
perhaps unintended—of [the] broad language [of the inventive 
concept requirement] in excluding a meritorious invention from the 
 
 433. See David O. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law 
Adjudication: Rules and Standards, 46 CONN. L. REV. 415, 473–74 (2013) (describing 
the need for certainty in property-rights regimes including the patent system). 
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 436. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1380–81 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (Linn, J., concurring). 
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 438. See id. at 1373 (majority opinion). 
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patent protection it deserves and should have been entitled to 
retain.”440 He went on to say that he saw “no reason, in policy or 
statute, why [Sequenom’s] breakthrough invention should be deemed 
patent ineligible.”441 
While the en banc court denied rehearing in Ariosa, several 
judges noted they were disturbed by the result.442 Judges Alan Lourie 
and Kimberley Moore, for example, explained that “it is unsound to 
have a rule that takes inventions of this nature out of the realm of 
patent-eligibility on grounds that they only claim a natural 
phenomenon plus conventional steps, or that they claim abstract 
concepts.”443 Judge Timothy Dyk too wrote an opinion highlighting 
his view of the problem with the inventive concept requirement; as he 
saw it, “there is a problem with Mayo insofar as it concludes that 
inventive concept cannot come from discovering something new in 
nature—e.g., identification of a previously unknown natural 
relationship or property.”444 Judge Dyk went so far as to propose a 
solution to the problem, “limiting the scope of patents based on new 
discoveries to narrow claims covering applications actually reduced to 
practice,” in other words actually built.445 
Even more recently, Judges Lourie and Pauline Newman have 
gone even further, expressing their belief in two identical opinions 
issued on the same day in two cases that “the law needs clarification, 
. . . perhaps by Congress, to work its way out of what so many in the 
innovation field consider are § 101 problems.”446 They explained that 
“[i]ndividual cases, whether heard by this court or the Supreme Court, 
are imperfect vehicles for enunciating broad principles because they 
are limited to the facts presented.”447 “Section 101 issues,” they 
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continued, “certainly require attention beyond the power of this 
court.”448  
In their opinions, Judges Lourie and Newman analyze the 
inventive concept requirement in the context of the prohibition on 
patenting abstract ideas, on the one hand, and physical phenomena and 
natural laws, on the other.449 With respect to the prohibition on 
patenting abstract ideas, they effectively propose eliminating the 
search for an inventive concept for two reasons: (1) it is unnecessary 
given the first step in the patent eligibility analysis; and (2) separate 
legal doctrines, the novelty and non-obviousness requirements, 
already account for the underlying concern:  
[W]hy should there be a step two in an abstract idea analysis at all? If a 
method is entirely abstract, is it no less abstract because it contains an 
inventive step? And, if a claim recites ‘something more,’ an ‘inventive’ 
physical or technological step, it is not an abstract idea, and can be examined 
under established patentability provisions such as §§ 102 and 103.450  
With respect to the prohibition on patenting physical phenomena and 
natural laws, they also again effectively propose eliminating the search 
for an inventive concept: “[C]laims to using such processes should not 
be barred at the threshold of a patentability analysis by being 
considered natural laws, as a method that utilizes a natural law is not 
itself a natural law.”451 In other words, it does not matter if a claim 
includes an inventive concept as long as it claims a use (any use) of a 
physical phenomenon or natural law.452 In this latter respect, it is 
important to note that while Judge Lourie and Judge Newman do not 
cite any support for their position, the long history of the patent utility 
doctrine indicates that the relevant question related to the usefulness 
of a discovery or invention is whether it has any practical use, not 
whether it has an inventive use, whatever that really means.453 
As compared to the situation in 1952, however, there are two 
important differences that may present problems for legislative 
reform, at least in the short term. First, it is difficult to say at this point 
whether the problem is a long-felt one. The Supreme Court created the 
inventive concept requirement relatively recently, in its 2012 decision 
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 449. See id. at 1375–76. 
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 451. Id. at 1376. 
 452. See id. Judges Lourie and Newman also take the position that “finding, 
isolating, and purifying such products are genuine acts of inventiveness” and so 
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 453. See, e.g., Lefstin, Menell & Taylor, supra note 4, at 558. 
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in Mayo v. Prometheus.454 Second, while in my view the need for 
reform is urgent, particularly given the reduced incentive to invest in 
innovation in life-sciences technologies,455 several large, well-funded, 
entrenched companies with significant lobbying ability do not view 
the problem as urgent, at least in the software industry, and may 
actively oppose legislative reform, at least to the extent it might impact 
that industry.456 
B. Involvement of Patent Bar 
The patent bar has called for reform and elimination of the 
inventive concept requirement but only recently started to organize 
itself. Scholarly research, for example, has been done. As just a few 
examples, Professor Jeff Lefstin has conducted insightful research to 
identify the root of the Supreme Court’s misinterpretation of the 
governing law in Mayo,457 and I have conducted extensive research 
regarding the requirement’s problems and potential solutions.458 In 
addition to this groundwork, leadership has been shown by three 
organizations: the American Intellectual Property Law Association 
(AIPLA), the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO), and the 
American Bar Association Section on Intellectual Property Law 
(ABA-IPL). Two patent attorneys, patent litigator Jerry Selinger and 
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patent prosecutor Marc Hubbard, led AIPLA’s task force addressing 
possible patent eligibility legislation.459 IBM in-house counsel Marian 
Underweiser and patent prosecutor Robert Sachs served as leaders of 
IPO’s similar group.460 The leaders of ABA-IPL’s corresponding 
working group have not been named publicly. Notably, each of these 
organizations published reports in 2017 criticizing the inventive 
concept requirement and calling for its elimination, each report 
identifying a specific legislative proposal.461 These proposals have 
gotten the ball rolling. In parallel with the efforts of these 
organizations, the USPTO held hearings in late 2016 to consider the 
views of the patent bar regarding the status of patent eligibility law 
and issued a report summarizing those views.462 The USPTO 
concluded that a majority of those presenting their views 
recommended legislative change, noting that the “call for legislation 
was particularly strong from the life sciences industry but also had 
many supporters from computer-related industries.”463 Moreover, the 
current Director of the USPTO, Andrei Iancu, has indicated that he 
supports efforts to reduce uncertainty regarding patent eligibility.464 
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In addition to those efforts, three law professors, Professors 
Lefstin, Peter Menell, and myself, organized a workshop of experts 
and interested parties in March 2017 to seek common ground with 
respect to how to proceed to create change.465 Participants in the 
workshop included law professors, in-house counsel, patent 
prosecutors, patent litigators, USPTO representatives, and legislative 
aides.466 In our final report, we identified problems with the inventive 
concept requirement and reached several conclusions.467 For example, 
we reported “[t]he workshop revealed broad agreement that the 
Supreme Court’s patent eligibility jurisprudence has diverged from 
the Patent Act’s text and legislative history as well as long-standing 
jurisprudential standards.”468 Furthermore, “the workshop revealed a 
consensus that it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will reconsider the 
patent-eligibility issue in the foreseeable future.”469 And we revealed 
consensus that “legislative reform will be necessary to effect 
significant change in patent-eligibility standards.”470 
The difference to date is that the patent bar has not consolidated 
around any one proposal.471 Each of the relevant groups is acting 
separately, unlike prior to 1952 when the Coordinating Council spoke 
as a unified voice for the patent bar. The fact that no legislation has 
been introduced to date likely reflects this lack of convergence.472 For 
legislative reform to occur, the patent bar is going to have to work in 
concert. It is unclear, however, whether that is even possible absent 
compromise given strong opponents of reform in the software 
industry, as already mentioned.473 
C. Good Drafting, Legislative Stewardship, Campaigning, Judicial 
Recognition, and Fortuity 
Consolidation around one proposal may nevertheless be 
possible. No doubt the members of the task forces of the AIPLA, IPO, 
and ABA-IPL have invested the time and effort to seek the best 
solution to the problems with the inventive concept requirement. It 
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remains to be seen whether a drafting committee can be formed and 
whether it can exercise the good judgment to select a successful 
proposal, and then fine tune it so that it is clear, concise, and, 
ultimately, effective. To do so, any such committee will need to 
demonstrate flexibility and willingness to improve. Moreover, it may 
behoove the group to adopt a prior judicial standard that provides an 
objective standard, as Rich did in 1950.474 
While the absence of one legislative proposal backed by the 
patent bar means it is clearly too early to discuss legislative 
stewardship in detail, several points are worth noting. On the one hand, 
there is at least one reason to think it might be more difficult to revise 
patent law now. Unlike in 1952, there will not be a codification of the 
patent laws. That was likely a one-time event. Yet modern reformists 
will still need to seek to eliminate controversial aspects of the 
legislation.475 To do so, they may need to combine any bill to eliminate 
the inventive concept requirement with other legislation providing for 
political compromise.476 On the other hand, there is reason to think it 
might be less difficult now. It is noteworthy that, like in 1952, the 
USPTO appears to support a legislative solution.477 But perhaps even 
more importantly, unlike in 1952, the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice does not seem likely to stand in the way of 
reform strengthening patent rights.478 Makan Delrahim, the current 
Assistant Attorney General—and the first head of the Antitrust 
 
 474. See Taylor, supra note 434, at 2212–13. 
 475. See Lefstin, Menell & Taylor, supra note 4, at 593–94. 
 476. See generally id. (providing an example of potential compromise points). 
 477. See Gene Quinn, Iancu: “It Is Unclear What Is Patentable and What Is 
Not, and That Can Depress Innovation”, IPWATCHDOG (May 22, 2018), 
www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/05/22/iancu-unclear-patentable-depress-innovation/ 
id=97559/ [https://perma.cc/45HE-Y2QF] (“The issue is very significant. It is 
significant to the Office, to our applicants, and it is significant to the entire industry. 
In some industries it is unclear what is patentable and what is not, and that can depress 
innovation in those particular areas . . . . Section 101, the code itself, has not been 
amended since 1952 . . . . In fact, the language is by and large written by Thomas 
Jefferson in the early 1790s, with very little amendment ever since then. Obviously, 
we have developed some new technologies since then. So, if this Committee, or 
Congress in general, is interested in tackling Section 101, we would be very happy to 
work with the Committee on those issues. In the meantime, the PTO is going to do 
what we must do, which is help the examination process.”). 
 478. See Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen., Remarks at the USC 
Gould School of Law’s Center for Transnational Law and Business Conference (Nov. 
10, 2017) (transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-
attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-usc-gould-school-laws-center 
[https://perma.cc/2G3J-93JV]). 
 Patent Reform, Then and Now 507 
Division to be a registered patent lawyer—recently has made several 
speeches supporting strong patent rights as necessary to growing the 
innovation economy.479 
It is also too early to discuss any speech or writing campaign to 
ensure that any legislation is properly interpreted and applied. These 
activities would need to be the subject of future work should 
legislation come together. And while discussion of judicial 
recognition of a nonexistent statute is similarly premature, it is 
important to note that any legislative reform would likely prove much 
easier to implement after enactment as compared to the aftermath of 
the Patent Act of 1952. Unlike then, when a Sixth Circuit judge made 
statements about his understanding of the Patent Act of 1952 that 
caused “instant shock” to a group of patent lawyers,480 today all 
appeals in patent cases go through the Federal Circuit rather than any 
of the regional circuits. As a result, the judges there have developed 
significant knowledge and expertise regarding the patent system and 
all of the various patent law doctrines. Success at the Supreme Court, 
of course, might still be difficult. But one need only consider the 
relative ease with which the Supreme Court recognized in Graham the 
elimination of the “flash of creative genius” test.481 Even if the 
Supreme Court in the future recognizes an express elimination of the 
inventive concept requirement, however, what is not certain is whether 
the Supreme Court will accept its elimination and apply a new 
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statutory requirement in its place,482 let alone whether its interpretation 
of any new statutory requirement will provide the inventive 
community with a clear test for patent eligibility. Success may depend 
(again) on fortuity, which of course is inherently unpredictable. 
 
* * * 
 
Understanding all of the factors that made possible enactment of 
the Patent Act of 1952 does not suggest all need to be present to 
overturn the Supreme Court’s requirement of an inventive concept. 
And the movement for reform still has many years to produce results. 
Nevertheless, the above analysis leads to three important suggestions 
to modern day reformists.483 First, there is a clear need for legislative 
intervention, which will become a long-felt need the longer 
intervention is delayed, and so some measure of patience is in order.484 
Second, the patent bar needs to consolidate forces, present one 
proposal, and speak with a unified voice.485 Third, to agree upon one 
proposal, reformists need to demonstrate flexibility and, if possible, 
adopt a prior judicial standard that provides an objective standard.486  
In this last regard, it is significant that Director Iancu recently 
laid out a case for replacing the inventive concept requirement (or, as 
applied, the “inventive application” test) with the Supreme Court’s 
historical practical application test.487 As I have described elsewhere, 
this practical application test not only reflects longstanding Supreme 
Court precedent488 but also would comport with the principles of broad 
eligibility, clarity, constraint on judicial intervention, and flexibility.489 
To replace the inventive application test with a practical application 
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test, “Congress, for example, might explain in the statute that the 
claimed subject matter must be a practical application of a natural law, 
physical phenomenon, or abstract idea.”490 Indeed, given the success 
in 1952 adopting a prior judicial standard, this might be modern 
reformist’s path to victory.  
CONCLUSION 
Modern critics of the patent system should understand that 
current problems with patent law doctrines reflect a much larger and 
longer ebb and flow in efforts to shape and control patent law by 
various institutional and non-institutional actors. In particular, the 
Supreme Court’s desire to inject an inventive concept requirement into 
patent law is not new. It has happened before, in the form of the 
invention requirement, both prior to 1952 and then again after Graham 
v. John Deere in Anderson’s-Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage Co. and 
Sakraida v. Ag Pro.491 In the words of Homer Schneider, “[i]sn’t that 
a remarkably consistent pendulum? And only as a pendulum are the 
Supreme Court shifts consistent. But the record isn’t all that 
surprising—history has a way of repeating itself.”492 
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